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I. INTRODUCTION 
When President George H. Bush signed the Americans with Dis-
abilities Act (ADA)1 into law, he hailed it as a landmark piece of legis-
lation that would open many “once-closed” doors for individuals with 
disabilities.2  One of the ADA’s most noticeable features is that in ad-
dition to prohibiting employers from firing and failing to hire indi-
viduals with disabilities, it places an affirmative obligation on employers 
to accommodate an employee’s or a candidate’s disability;3 however, 
because the ADA defines “disability” in three ways,4 a question arose 
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his J.D. from the Vanderbilt University Law School and his LL.M. from the George-
town University Law Center.  The author would like to thank Jennifer Cloyd and Tif-
fany Yahr for their help with this Article. 
 1 Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101–12213 
(2000). 
 2 At the signing of the ADA, President Bush observed the following: “With to-
day’s signing of the landmark Americans for [sic] Disabilities Act, every man, woman, 
and child with a disability can now pass through once-closed doors into a bright new 
era of equality, independence, and freedom.”  President George H. Bush, Remarks 
of President George Bush at the Signing of the Americans with Disabilities Act (July 
26, 1990), available at http://www.eeoc.gov/ada/bushspeech.html. 
 3 Specifically, the ADA defines “discrimination” as: 
not making reasonable accommodations to the known physical or 
mental limitations of an otherwise qualified individual with a disability 
who is an applicant or employee, unless such covered entity can dem-
onstrate that the accommodation would impose an undue hardship on 
the operation of the business of such covered entity . . . . 
42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A) (2000). 
 4 The ADA defines a “disability” as: 
(A) a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or 
more of the major life activities of such individual; 
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regarding whether anyone who satisfies the disability definition is enti-
tled to an accommodation, or whether the accommodation require-
ment applies only to those individuals with actual disabilities. 
Recently, the United States Courts of Appeals for the Eleventh, 
Tenth, and Third Circuits decided that individuals who are regarded as 
having disabilities are entitled to accommodations.5  Prior to these de-
cisions, four United States Courts of Appeals had determined that in-
dividuals regarded as disabled were not entitled to ADA accommoda-
tions.6  Before those decisions, the only other United States Court of 
Appeals to address this issue, the United States Court of Appeals for 
the First Circuit, assumed the opposite—that individuals regarded as 
disabled were, in fact, entitled to accommodations.7  While the First 
 
(B) a record of such an impairment; or 
(C) being regarded as having such an impairment. 
42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (2000). 
 5 D’Angelo v. ConAgra Foods, Inc., 422 F.3d 1220 (11th Cir. 2005); Kelly v. Met-
allics W., Inc., 410 F.3d 670 (10th Cir. 2005); Williams v. Phila. Hous. Auth. Police 
Dep’t, 380 F.3d 751 (3d Cir. 2004).  According to the Code of Federal Regulations, 
an employee is “regarded as” disabled if she: 
(1) Has a physical or mental impairment that does not substantially 
limit major life activities but is treated by a covered entity as constitut-
ing such limitation; 
(2) Has a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits major 
life activities only as a result of the attitudes of others toward such im-
pairment; or 
(3) Has none of the impairments defined in paragraph (h) (1) or (2) 
of this section but is treated by a covered entity as having a substantially 
limiting impairment. 
29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(l) (2005). 
 6 Kaplan v. City of N. Las Vegas, 323 F.3d 1226 (9th Cir. 2003); Weber v. Strippit, 
Inc., 186 F.3d 907 (8th Cir. 1999); Workman v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 165 F.3d 460 (6th Cir. 
1999); Newberry v. E. Tex. State Univ., 161 F.3d 276 (5th Cir. 1998). 
 7 Katz v. City Metal Co., 87 F.3d 26 (1st Cir. 1996).  In addition to the cases from 
the United States Courts of Appeals, several United States District Courts have ad-
dressed this issue.  Among the opinions that have found that employers do not need 
to accommodate these individuals are Deppe v. United Airlines, No. C 96-02941-CRB, 
2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11569, at *15 (N.D. Cal. Jul. 29, 2001); Danyluk-Coyle v. St. 
Mary’s Medical Center, No. 00-5943, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24574, at *4 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 
5, 2001); Fontanilla v. City and County of San Francisco, No. C-96-3916 JCS, 2001 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 6919, at *53 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 28, 2001); Price v. City of Terrell, No. 3 99-CV-
0269-D, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18588, at *13–16 (N.D. Tex. Dec. 20, 2000); Ross v. 
Matthews Employment, No. 00-C-1420, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16554, at *13 (N.D. Ill. 
Oct. 24, 2000); and Matlock v. City of Dallas, No. 3:97-CV-2735-D, 1999 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 17953, at *17 (N.D. Tex. Nov. 12, 1999).  Among the opinions that have de-
cided that employers do have to accommodate these individuals are Lorinz v. Turner 
Construction Co., No. 00 CV 6123SJ, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 28825, at *22–23 (E.D.N.Y. 
May 25, 2004); Miller v. Heritage Products, Inc., No. 1:02-cv-1345-DFH, 2004 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 8531, at *27 (S.D. Ind. Apr. 21, 2004); Jacques v. DiMarzio, Inc., 200 F. Supp. 2d 
151, 170 (E.D.N.Y. 2002); and Jewell v. Reid’s Confectionary Co., 172 F. Supp. 2d 212, 
219 (D. Me. 2001). 
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Circuit in Katz v. City Metal Co. was not confronted with this issue di-
rectly, courts have interpreted Katz as requiring accommodations for 
individuals regarded as having a disability.8 
It is clear that this issue has now created a split among the 
United States Courts of Appeals, with four circuits agreeing that ac-
commodations are required in cases involving plaintiffs regarded as 
disabled,9 four circuits believing that accommodations are not re-
quired in such cases,10 and four circuits not having decided the is-
sue.11  Until the Supreme Court answers this question, this confusion 
will continue.12 
This Article will first identify and discuss the arguments courts 
have relied upon to determine that individuals regarded as disabled 
are entitled to accommodations.  The Article will then discuss the ar-
guments proffered by courts that have reached the opposite conclu-
sion.  Next, the Article will analyze the major federal cases addressing 
this issue.13  Finally, this Article will suggest that a bright-line rule de-
nying accommodations in these cases is not the correct way to apply 
the ADA, and that in most cases, individuals regarded as disabled 
should be entitled to an accommodation. 
If, however, courts are unwilling to adopt a bright-line rule re-
quiring accommodations, courts could use a multi-factor test to de-
termine this issue on a case-by-case basis.  Regardless of which sugges-
tion courts adopt, an across-the-board refusal to provide 
 
 8 D’Angelo, 422 F.3d at 1235; Kelly, 410 F.3d at 675; Williams, 380 F.3d at 773; and 
Weber, 186 F.3d at 916–17, interpreted Katz as requiring accommodations for indi-
viduals regarded as being disabled. 
 9 The jurisdictions that require accommodations in these cases are the First, 
Third, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits. 
 10 The jurisdictions that do not require accommodations are the Fifth, Sixth, 
Eighth, and Ninth Circuits. 
 11 The Second, Fourth, Seventh, and District of Columbia Circuits have not yet 
answered the issue.  When I started writing this Article, only one circuit, the Third 
Circuit, had specifically held that accommodations are required in these cases; how-
ever, since that time, the Eleventh and Tenth Circuits have also reached this conclu-
sion.  D’Angelo, 422 F.3d 1220; Kelly, 410 F.3d 670. 
 12 The Supreme Court denied a petition for certiorari in Williams, 380 F.3d 751, 
cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 1725 (2005). 
 13 Because not all United States Courts of Appeals have addressed this issue, I will 
not address cases from the Fourth Circuit or from the D.C. Circuit.  In the Fourth 
Circuit, at least one district court has indicated that accommodations are not re-
quired in cases involving individuals regarded as disabled.  Betts v. Rector and Visi-
tors of the Univ. of Va., 198 F. Supp. 2d 787, 799 (W.D. Va. 2002); but see Dean v. 
Philip Morris USA, Inc., No. 1:02CV149, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13035, at *10–11 
(M.D.N.C. July 29, 2003) (citing Taylor v. Pathmark Stores, Inc., 177 F.3d 180, 196 
(3d Cir. 1999) (observing that the ADA “does not appear to distinguish between dis-
abled and ‘regarded as’ individuals in requiring accommodation”)). 
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accommodations to individuals regarded as disabled is flawed and 
does not further the purposes of the “landmark” legislation President 
Bush signed into law sixteen years ago. 
II. THE ARGUMENTS FOR REQUIRING ACCOMMODATIONS IN 
“REGARDED AS” CASES 
There are several arguments courts have used when deciding 
that individuals regarded as disabled are entitled to accommodations.  
The most common one is that the ADA’s plain language does not dis-
tinguish between the various definitions of disability; therefore, all 
“disabled” individuals should be treated similarly.14  The courts that 
require accommodations in “regarded as” cases also find support in 
the Supreme Court’s decision in School Board of Nassau County v. Ar-
line,15 the ADA’s legislative history, and in the policies behind the 
ADA.  Additionally, some courts believe that the ADA’s interactive 
process, in which the employer and employee work together to de-
termine an accommodation that would allow the employee to per-
form the essential functions of her job, demonstrates that accommo-
dations are required for “regarded as” individuals.16  Finally, these 
courts have rejected the “windfall” and “bizarre results” arguments 
made by courts that believe that accommodations are not required in 
“regarded as” cases.17  Regardless of their reasoning, these courts con-
cluded that plaintiffs regarded as disabled are entitled to accommo-
dations.  Although this was the minority position until recently, there 
are several strong arguments for this position.  This Article will now 
examine those arguments in more detail. 
A. The ADA’s Plain Language 
Not surprisingly, the first argument several pro-plaintiff courts 
have made with respect to this issue is that the ADA’s plain language 
 
 14 Some of the cases that have followed this reasoning include D’Angelo, 422 F.3d 
at 1235–36; Williams, 380 F.3d at 774–75; and Jacques v. DiMarzio, Inc., 200 F. Supp. 
2d 151, 166 (E.D.N.Y. 2002). 
 15 480 U.S. 273 (1987). 
 16 Jacques, 200 F. Supp. 2d at 170; Jewell v. Reid’s Confectionary Co., 172 F. Supp. 
2d 212, 219 (D. Me. 2001).  But see Bishop v. Nu-Way Serv. Stations, Inc., 340 F. Supp. 
2d 1008, 1014 (E.D. Mo. 2004) (noting that employers are not required to engage in 
the interactive process in cases involving individuals regarded as disabled). 
 17 D’Angelo, 422 F.3d at 1237–39; Kelly v. Metallics W., Inc., 410 F.3d 670, 676 
(10th Cir. 2005); Williams, 380 F.3d at 774–75; Jacques, 200 F. Supp. 2d at 170–71.  
Throughout the Article, I will refer to the windfall/bizarre result argument as the 
windfall argument. 
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requires accommodations for individuals regarded as disabled.18  Al-
though the ADA does not contain a specific provision regarding this 
particular issue, a combination of the ADA’s provisions has led courts 
to conclude that accommodations are required in cases involving in-
dividuals regarded as disabled.  According to these courts, the ADA’s 
relevant provisions include the ADA’s substantive prohibition against 
discrimination19 and its definitions of “discrimination,”20 “disability,”21 
and “qualified individual with a disability.”22  How these provisions re-
late to one another is of critical importance; it is why many courts 
have concluded that the ADA’s language requires employers to ac-
commodate individuals regarded as having disabilities.23  In fact, even 
courts that have concluded that accommodations are not required for 
individuals regarded as disabled have agreed that the ADA’s plain 
language, if taken at face value, requires accommodations in these 
situations.24 
The first relevant provision is the ADA’s general prohibition 
against discrimination.25  This section, which incorporates the other 
 
 18 The courts do this because one of the first rules of statutory interpretation is 
that courts must follow the plain language of the statute.  Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 
519 U.S. 337, 340 (1997) (noting that the first step in interpreting a statute “is to de-
termine whether the language at issue has a plain and unambiguous meaning with 
regard to the particular dispute in the case”). 
 19 Specifically, the ADA’s general prohibition against discrimination states: 
General rule.  No covered entity shall discriminate against a qualified 
individual with a disability because of the disability of such individual in 
regard to job application procedures, the hiring, advancement, or dis-
charge of employees, employee compensation, job training, and other 
terms, conditions, and privileges of employment. 
42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (2000). 
 20 See supra note 3 for the ADA’s definition of discrimination. 
 21 See supra note 4 for the ADA’s definition of disability. 
 22 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8) (2000).  According to this statutory provision, a “qualified 
individual with a disability” is “an individual with a disability who, with or without rea-
sonable accommodation, can perform the essential functions of the employment po-
sition that such individual holds or desires.”  Id. 
 23 D’Angelo v. ConAgra Foods, Inc., 422 F.3d 1220, 1235–36 (11th Cir. 2005); 
Kelly v. Metallics W., Inc., 410 F.3d 670, 675 (10th Cir. 2005); Williams v. Phila. Hous. 
Auth. Police Dep’t, 380 F.3d 751, 774–75 (3d Cir. 2004); Lorinz v. Turner Constr. 
Co., No. 00 CV 6123SJ, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 28825, at *22–23 (E.D.N.Y. May 25, 
2004); Miller v. Heritage Prods., Inc., No. 1:02-cv-1345-DFH, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
8531, at *27–28 (S.D. Ind. Apr. 21, 2004); Jacques v. DiMarzio, Inc., 200 F. Supp. 2d 
151, 166–68 (E.D.N.Y. 2002); Jewell v. Reid’s Confectionary Co., 172 F. Supp. 2d 212, 
218–19 (D. Me. 2001). 
 24 Kaplan v. City of N. Las Vegas, 323 F.3d 1226, 1232 (9th Cir. 2003); Weber v. 
Strippit, Inc., 186 F.3d 907, 917 (8th Cir. 1999); but see Fontanilla v. City and County 
of S.F., No. C-96-3916 JCS, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6919, at *48–49 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 28, 
2001) (deciding that the ADA’s language is not clear on this issue). 
 25 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (2000). 
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relevant terms, provides that “[n]o covered entity shall discriminate 
against a qualified individual with a disability because of the disability of 
such individual in regard to job application procedures, the hiring, 
advancement, or discharge of employees, employee compensation, 
job training, and other terms, conditions, and privileges of employ-
ment.”26  Thus, it is clear that to show an ADA violation, the plaintiff 
must prove that the employer “discriminated” against her.27  It is also 
clear that the plaintiff must be a “qualified individual with a disabil-
ity.”28  Thus, we must now evaluate those terms. 
The next relevant term is “discrimination.”29  Included within 
this definition is subsection five, which prohibits “not making reasonable 
accommodations to the known physical or mental limitations of an oth-
erwise qualified individual with a disability who is an applicant or 
employee” as long as the accommodation would not pose an “undue 
hardship” on the employer’s operations.30  Thus, it is clear that both 
the substantive prohibition against discrimination and the definition 
of discrimination protect “qualified individuals with disabilities.” 
Thus, the next critical term is “disability.”31  And, as was men-
tioned before, there are three prongs to this definition.  First, an em-
ployee has a “disability” if she has a “physical or mental impairment 
that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of such 
individual.”32  Second, she can satisfy the “disability” definition if she 
has “a record of such an impairment.”33  Finally, and most important 
for the purposes of this Article, she can satisfy the “disability” defini-
tion by “being regarded as having such an impairment.”34 
The final relevant term is “qualified individual with a disability.”35  
The ADA protects only those people who satisfy this definition, and 
those individuals with disabilities who are not qualified can not seek 
the ADA’s protection.  A “qualified individual with a disability” is “an 
individual with a disability who, with or without reasonable accommodation, 
can perform the essential functions of the employment position that 
 
 26 Id. (emphasis added). 
 27 Id.; see supra note 3 for the statutory definition of “discrimination.” 
 28 See supra note 22 for the statutory definition of “qualified individual with a dis-
ability.” 
 29 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b) (2000). 
 30 Id. § 12112(b)(5)(A) (emphasis added). 
 31 Id. § 12102(2). 
 32 Id. § 12102(2)(A). 
 33 Id. § 12102(2)(B). 
 34 Id. § 12102(2)(C). 
 35 See supra note 22 for the statutory definition of “qualified individual with a dis-
ability.” 
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such individual holds or desires.”36  The definition makes no distinc-
tion between actual disabilities and “regarded as” disabilities, and the 
courts that have concluded that accommodations are required for 
“regarded as” individuals have used this lack of a distinction as a basis 
for those opinions.37 
Thus, when pro-plaintiff courts read the ADA’s provisions, they 
realize that the Act’s plain language requires employers to accommo-
date individuals who are regarded as disabled.38  This plain language 
argument is typically the first one these pro-plaintiff courts use when 
interpreting this issue because, as the Supreme Court noted in Robin-
son v. Shell Oil Co.,39 the statutory language is the first place courts 
should look when attempting to interpret a statute.40  Although the 
plain language argument might be these courts’ first argument, it is 
by no means their only argument, as they have found several other 
reasons to conclude that accommodations are required for cases in-
volving individuals regarded as having a disability. 
 
 36 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8) (2000) (emphasis added). 
 37 D’Angelo v. ConAgra Foods, Inc., 422 F.3d 1220, 1235–36 (11th Cir. 2005); 
Kelly v. Metallics W., Inc., 410 F.3d 670, 676 (10th Cir. 2005); Williams v. Phila. Hous. 
Auth. Police Dep’t, 380 F.3d 751, 774 (3d Cir. 2004); Lorinz v. Turner Constr. Co., 
No. 00 CV 6123SJ, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 28825, at *22–23 (E.D.N.Y. May 25, 2004); 
Miller v. Heritage Prods., Inc., No. 1:02-cv-1345-DFH, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8531, at 
*27–28 (S.D. Ind. Apr. 21, 2004); Jacques v. DiMarzio, Inc., 200 F. Supp. 2d 151, 166 
(E.D.N.Y. 2002); Jewell v. Reid’s Confectionary Co., 172 F. Supp. 2d 212, 218–19 (D. 
Me. 2001). 
 38 The following cases all relied on the ADA’s plain language to reach the conclu-
sion that accommodations are required for individuals “regarded as” disabled: 
D’Angelo, 422 F.3d at 1235–36; Kelly, 410 F.3d at 675–76; Williams, 380 F.3d at 774–75; 
Lorinz, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 28825, at *22–23; Miller, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8531, at 
*27–28; Jacques, 200 F. Supp. 2d at 166–68; Jewell, 172 F. Supp. 2d at 218–19.  Even 
some of the United States Courts of Appeals that came to the opposite conclusion 
conceded that the ADA’s plain language would justify such an interpretation.  See, 
e.g., Kaplan v. City of N. Las Vegas, 323 F.3d 1226, 1232 (9th Cir. 2003); Weber v. 
Strippit, Inc., 186 F.3d 907, 917 (8th Cir. 1999).  These courts have ignored the 
ADA’s plain language based on their belief that applying the plain language would 
yield “bizarre results.” 
 39 519 U.S. 337 (1997). 
 40 Id. at 340 (noting that the first step in interpreting a statute “is to determine 
whether the language at issue has a plain and unambiguous meaning with regard to 
the particular dispute in the case”). 
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B. The Supreme Court’s Opinion in School Board of Nassau 
County v. Arline,41 the ADA’s Legislative History, and the Policies 
Behind the ADA 
Other reasons courts have concluded that the ADA requires ac-
commodations for individuals regarded as disabled are the Supreme 
Court’s decision in School Board of Nassau County v. Arline,42 the ADA’s 
legislative history, which specifically references Arline, and the poli-
cies underlying the ADA.  Some courts have concluded that because 
the Court in Arline determined that under the Rehabilitation Act,43 an 
individual who had a record of an impairment that substantially lim-
ited a major life activity could be entitled to an accommodation, an 
individual regarded as having a disability under the ADA is also enti-
tled to such an accommodation.44  Additionally, courts have con-
cluded that Congress’s extensive reliance on Arline when drafting the 
ADA45 further supports the proposition that “regarded as” plaintiffs 
are entitled to accommodations.  Finally, and related to the ADA’s 
legislative history, are the policies behind the ADA, which many 
courts believe support a requirement that employers provide accom-
modations in “regarded as” cases. 
In its Arline opinion, the Court discussed individuals with records 
of handicaps,46 those who were “regarded as” having handicaps, and 
 
 41 480 U.S. 273 (1987). 
 42 Id. 
 43 The Rehabilitation Act can be found at 29 U.S.C. §§ 791–794e.  Most ADA 
cases are interpreted in a manner similar to cases brought under the Rehabilitation 
Act, as one provision of the ADA provides that “[e]xcept as otherwise provided in 
this Act, nothing in this Act shall be construed to apply a lesser standard than the 
standards applied under title V of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 or the regulations 
issued by Federal agencies pursuant to such title.”  42 U.S.C. § 12201(a) (citation 
omitted). 
 44 Some of the courts that have relied upon Arline for the conclusion that indi-
viduals regarded as being disabled are entitled to accommodations under the ADA 
include D’Angelo, 422 F.3d at 1236–37; Williams, 380 F.3d at 775; and Jacques, 200 F. 
Supp. 2d at 166–67. 
 45 See, e.g., 136 CONG. REC. E1913, E1914 (daily ed. June 13, 1990) (statement of 
Rep. Hoyer), 1990 WL 80290 (“[T]he act retains the flexib[le] definition that was 
first adopted in Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, that has been in effect 
for over 15 years, and that was recently explicated clearly by the Supreme Court in 
School Board of Nassau County v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273 (1987).”); H.R. REP. NO. 101-485, 
pt. 3 (1990), as reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 445, 453 (“The rationale for this third 
test [the “regarded as” prong of the disability definition], as used in the Rehabilita-
tion Act of 1973, was articulated by the Supreme Court in School Board of Nassau 
County v. Arline.”). 
 46 Originally, Congress used the word “handicap” in the Rehabilitation Act.  This 
terminology was eventually changed to “disability.”  See Mahon v. Crowell, 295 F.3d 
585, 589 (6th Cir. 2002). 
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how employers’ and co-workers’ perceptions about these issues can 
be just as debilitating as actual handicaps.47  Since Arline, several 
courts have expressed their belief that because Congress repeatedly 
referenced Arline when discussing the ADA’s “regarded as” prong of 
its disability definition,48 the logical conclusion is that Congress in-
tended that accommodations be available for people regarded as dis-
abled.49  In Arline, the plaintiff, a teacher who had contracted tubercu-
losis, sued her employer for violating the Rehabilitation Act.50  The 
plaintiff suffered her initial outbreak in 1957, but between 1957 and 
1977 the disease was in remission.51  The plaintiff tested positive again 
once in 1977 and twice in 1978.52  In 1979, the school board termi-
nated the plaintiff as a result of her positive tests.53  The district court 
ruled against the plaintiff, but the Eleventh Circuit concluded that 
the plaintiff did suffer from a handicap54 and remanded for a deter-
mination of whether the plaintiff was “otherwise qualified” for her 
position and whether there was an accommodation that would allow 
her to perform her job.55 
The Supreme Court started its analysis by discussing the history 
behind the Rehabilitation Act, focusing on the definition of “handi-
capped individual.”56  The Court noted that Congress had amended 
that definition to include those with a record of having handicaps 
and those who were regarded as having handicaps.57  According to 
the Court, by expanding this definition, Congress was showing its 
concern about “‘archaic attitudes and laws’” and about “‘the fact that 
American people are simply unfamiliar with and insensitive to the dif-
ficulties confront[ing] individuals with handicaps.’”58 
The first issue the Court addressed was whether the plaintiff was 
a “handicapped individual” within the meaning of the Rehabilitation 
Act.59  The Court quickly decided that she fell under this definition, 
 
 47 Arline, 480 U.S. at 282–84. 
 48 See supra note 45. 
 49 See D’Angelo, 422 F.3d at 1236–37; see also Williams, 380 F.3d at 775; Jacques, 200 
F. Supp. 2d at 166–67. 
 50 Arline, 480 U.S. at 275–76. 
 51 Id. at 276. 
 52 Id. 
 53 Id. 
 54 Id. at 277. 
 55 Id. 
 56 Arline, 480 U.S. at 277–78. 
 57 Id. at 279 (citing 29 U.S.C. § 706(7)(B)). 
 58 Id. (quoting S. REP. NO. 93-1297, at 50 (1974)). 
 59 Id. at 279–80. 
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viewing her 1957 hospitalization as sufficient evidence that she had a 
record of a handicap.60  The Court next addressed the employer’s as-
sertion that it terminated the plaintiff not because of her disease, but 
rather due to the threat her condition posed to others.  The Court 
concluded that it was not possible to “meaningfully distinguish” be-
tween the contagious disease and its possible contagious effects.61 
When it addressed the “regarded as” prong of the handicap 
definition, the Court noted that Congress extended protection to in-
dividuals with non-substantially limiting impairments because “[s]uch 
an impairment might not diminish a person’s physical or mental ca-
pabilities, but could nevertheless substantially limit that person’s abil-
ity to work as a result of the negative reactions of others to the im-
pairment.”62  The Court also observed that “Congress acknowledged 
that society’s accumulated myths and fears about disability and dis-
ease are as handicapping as are the physical limitations that flow from 
actual impairment.”63 
After concluding that the plaintiff satisfied the Rehabilitation 
Act’s definition of a handicapped individual, the Court addressed 
whether she was “otherwise qualified” to perform her job with or 
without a reasonable accommodation.64  On this question, the Court 
remanded the case to the district court to determine whether an in-
dividual with a record of having a handicap could perform the essen-
tial functions of her job with a reasonable accommodation.65  Because 
reasonable accommodations only become an issue if the court de-
termines that the individual has a disability,66 and because the Arline 
plaintiff, who had a record of a disability, was possibly entitled to an 
accommodation, courts since Arline have determined that these ac-
commodations are required in cases involving any of the three 
prongs of the disability definition, including the “regarded as” 
prong.67  In addition, because Congress referenced Arline when dis-
cussing the “regarded as” prong of the ADA’s disability definition,68 
 
 60 Id. at 280–81. 
 61 Id. at 282. 
 62 Arline, 480 U.S. at 283. 
 63 Id. at 284. 
 64 Id. at 287. 
 65 Id. at 289. 
 66 See, e.g., D’Angelo v. ConAgra Foods, Inc., 422 F.3d 1220, 1236–37 (11th Cir. 
2005); Williams v. Phila. Hous. Auth. Police Dep’t, 380 F.3d 751, 775 (3d Cir. 2004); 
Jacques v. DiMarzio, Inc., 200 F. Supp. 2d 151, 166–67 (E.D.N.Y. 2002). 
 67 See, e.g., D’Angelo, 422 F.3d at 1236; Williams, 380 F.3d at 775; Jacques, 200 F. 
Supp. at 166–67. 
 68 See supra note 45. 
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courts have concluded that the ADA’s legislative history also supports 
requiring accommodations in “regarded as” cases.69 
Related to the legislative history behind the ADA are the various 
policies Congress wanted to further when passing this legislation.  By 
relying on Arline when discussing the ADA, Congress made clear that 
one of these policies was to eliminate disability discrimination by 
eliminating stereotypes about people with disabilities and diseases.70  
The Supreme Court made this clear in Arline, and some courts have 
concluded that not providing accommodations in “regarded as” cases 
would frustrate that purpose.71  For example, the court in Jacques v. 
DiMarzio, Inc. concluded that “‘failure to mandate reasonable ac-
commodations [in “regarded as” cases] would undermine the role 
the ADA plays in ferreting out disability discrimination in employ-
ment.’”72  This sentiment was echoed in Deane v. Pocono Medical Center, 
where the plaintiff argued that “the ‘regarded as’ prong of the dis-
ability definition is premised upon the reality that the perception of 
disability, socially constructed and reinforced, is difficult to destroy, 
and in most cases, merely informing the employer of its mispercep-
tion will not be enough.”73  Thus, some courts have concluded that 
not requiring accommodations would not do enough to eliminate 
disability discrimination in the workplace. 
Another policy behind the ADA, and one that is also related to 
the goal of trying to eliminate employer bias, was expressed in Jewell 
v. Reid’s Confectionary Co.,74 where the court noted that one purpose of 
the ADA was to punish employers who made stereotypic assumptions 
about their employees.75  Because not requiring accommodations in 
“regarded as” cases would frustrate that goal, the court in Jewell de-
cided that accommodations were required.76  One final goal of the 
 
 69 See, e.g., D’Angelo, 422 F.3d at 1236; Williams, 380 F.3d at 775; Jacques, 200 F. 
Supp. 2d at 166–67. 
 70 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (2000).  See also U.S. Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391, 
401 (2002) (noting that the ADA “seeks to diminish or to eliminate the stereotypical 
thought processes, the thoughtless actions, and the hostile reactions that far too of-
ten bar those with disabilities from participating fully in the Nation’s life, including 
the workplace”). 
 71 See, e.g., D’Angelo, 422 F.3d at 1236–37; Williams, 380 F.3d at 775; Jacques, 200 F. 
Supp. 2d at 166–67. 
 72 Jacques, 200 F. Supp. 2d at 167 (quoting Deane v. Pocono Med. Ctr., 142 F.3d 
138, 148 n.12 (3d Cir. 1998)). 
 73 Deane, 142 F.3d at148 n.12. 
 74 172 F. Supp. 2d 212 (D. Me. 2001). 
 75 Id. at 219. 
 76 Id. 
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ADA was to allow capable employees to remain in the workforce.77  
Allowing accommodations in “regarded as” cases would entitle more 
individuals to remain employed, which would further that policy. 
Thus, the Supreme Court’s opinion in Arline, the ADA’s legisla-
tive history, and the purposes behind the ADA are all cited by courts 
when concluding that accommodations are required in cases involv-
ing individuals regarded as disabled.  These, however, are not the 
only reasons courts use when interpreting the ADA in a pro-employee 
manner.  The next few sections of this Article will address the other 
reasons why courts conclude that accommodations are required in 
“regarded as” cases. 
C. The ADA’s Interactive Process for Determining Reasonable 
Accommodations 
Some courts have used the structure of the ADA, its legislative 
history, and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission’s 
(EEOC) regulations encouraging employers and employees to work 
together to develop appropriate workplace accommodations to con-
clude that employees who are regarded as disabled are entitled to ac-
commodations.78  These courts reasoned that this interactive process 
provides additional evidence that accommodations are required in 
“regarded as” cases. 
Specifically, the court in Jacques v. DiMarzio, Inc.79 used the exis-
tence of the “mandatory” interactive process to conclude that ac-
commodations are required in “regarded as” cases.80  When address-
ing this interactive process, the Jacques court pointed out that 
Congress noted: 
A problem-solving approach should be used to identify the par-
ticular tasks or aspects of the work environment that limit per-
formance and to identify possible accommodations . . . .  Employ-
ers first will consult with and involve the individual with a 
disability in deciding on the appropriate accommodation.81 
 
 77 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (2000). 
 78 See Jacques v. DiMarzio, Inc., 200 F. Supp. 2d 151, 169 (E.D.N.Y. 2002); see also 
Jewell, 172 F. Supp. 2d at 218–19. 
 79 200 F. Supp. 2d 151. 
 80 Id. at 168–70.  Although not all courts have addressed this particular issue, 
most courts have concluded that this process is, in fact, mandatory.  See, e.g., Barnett 
v. U.S. Airways, Inc., 228 F.3d 1105 (9th Cir. 2000), rev’d on other grounds, 535 U.S. 391 
(2002); Smith v. Midland Brake, Inc., 180 F.3d 1154 (10th Cir. 1999). 
 81 Jacques, 200 F. Supp. 2d at 168 (quoting S. REP. NO. 101-116, at 34 (1989)) (cit-
ing H.R. REP. NO. 101-485, pt. 2, at 65 (1990), as reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 
303, 348). 
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This issue was also addressed in the EEOC’s regulations, which 
provide: 
To determine the appropriate reasonable accommodation it may 
be necessary for the covered entity to initiate an informal, interac-
tive process with the qualified individual with a disability in need 
of the accommodation.  This process should identify the precise 
limitations resulting from the disability and potential reasonable 
accommodations that could overcome those limitations.82 
As the Jacques court pointed out, the EEOC has further observed 
that the employer should initiate this interactive process without be-
ing asked to do so by the employee if the employer: (1) knows that 
the employee has a disability; (2) knows, or has reason to know, that 
the employee is experiencing workplace problems because of the dis-
ability; and (3) knows, or has reason to know, that the disability pre-
vents the employee from requesting a reasonable accommodation.83  
According to Jacques, this does not require that an employer know of 
an actual disability, but rather only that the employer have “enough 
information to put it on notice that the employee might have a disabil-
ity.”84  This, according to Jacques, leads to the conclusion that the in-
teractive process is triggered once the employee is regarded as having 
a disability, not once the employer knows that to be the case.85  Fur-
thermore, because this process is meant to allow employers to keep 
capable employees in the workforce, the Jacques court concluded: 
 In a practical sense, therefore, the interactive process is more of 
a labor tool than a legal tool, and is a prophylactic means to 
guard against capable employees losing their jobs even if they are 
not actually disabled.  It is clearly a mechanism to allow for early 
intervention by an employer, outside of the legal forum, for ex-
ploring reasonable accommodations for employees who are per-
ceived to be disabled.86 
The Jacques court thus concluded that this interactive process is 
more evidence that accommodations are required for individuals re-
garded as disabled.87  This is not, however, the final reason some 
 
 82 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(3) (2005). 
 83 Jacques, 200 F. Supp. 2d at 168–69 (citing EEOC, NOTICE NO. 915.002, 
ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE: REASONABLE ACCOMMODATION AND UNDUE HARDSHIP UNDER 
THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT, EEOC Comp. Man. (CCH), § 902, at 5459 
(March 1, 1999), available at http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/accommodation. 
html). 
 84 Id. at 169 (emphasis added). 
 85 Id. 
 86 Id. at 170 (emphasis added). 
 87 Id. 
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courts are deciding that individuals regarded as disabled are entitled 
to accommodations; many courts have specifically rejected the argu-
ments made by other courts that concluded accommodations are not 
required in these cases. 
D. Rejection of the Windfall Argument and the Belief that Employers 
Should be Held Accountable if They Refuse to Shed Erroneous 
Perceptions About Their Employees 
One of the most common arguments used by courts that have 
concluded that employees regarded as disabled are not entitled to ac-
commodations is the “windfall” argument, which focuses on the prac-
tice of entitling employees who are erroneously regarded as disabled 
by their employers to accommodations while similarly situated em-
ployees, whom employers do not regard as disabled, are not entitled 
to such accommodations.88  Some courts, including the Eighth and 
Ninth Circuits, conclude that this is a “bizarre result” that provides a 
windfall to these “regarded as” employees.89  Despite the fact that 
many pro-employer courts have used this argument, several other 
courts have specifically rejected it. 
The Eleventh Circuit in D’Angelo v. ConAgra Foods, Inc.,90 the 
Tenth Circuit in Kelly v. Metallics West, Inc.,91 the Third Circuit in Wil-
liams v. Philadelphia Housing Authority Police Department,92 and the East-
ern District of New York in Jacques v. DiMarzio, Inc.93 all rejected this 
windfall argument, concluding that employees who are regarded as 
disabled are not situated similarly to those employees who are not re-
garded as disabled by their employers; therefore, “regarded as” em-
ployees receive no “windfall.”94  As the court in Jacques made clear, “an 
employee who is simply impaired and an employee who is impaired 
and ‘regarded as’ disabled are not similarly situated since the ‘re-
garded as’ disabled employee is subject to the stigma of the disabling 
and discriminatory attitudes of others.”95 
 
 88 See, e.g., Kaplan v. City of N. Las Vegas, 323 F.3d 1226, 1232 (9th Cir. 2003); 
Weber v. Strippit, Inc., 186 F.3d 907, 917 (8th Cir. 1999). 
 89 See, e.g., Kaplan, 323 F.3d at 1232; Weber, 186 F.3d at 917. 
 90 422 F.3d 1220 (11th Cir. 2005). 
 91 410 F.3d 670 (10th Cir. 2005). 
 92 380 F.3d 751 (3d Cir. 2004). 
 93 200 F. Supp. 2d 151 (E.D.N.Y. 2002). 
 94 D’Angelo, 422 F.3d at 1237–39; Kelly, 410 F.3d at 676; Williams, 380 F.3d at 775–
76; Jacques, 200 F. Supp. 2d at 170–71. 
 95 Jacques, 200 F. Supp. 2d at 170.  The court in Jacques also rejected the Weber ar-
gument that “undeserving” employees would force accommodations upon their em-
ployers, noting that the ADA’s interactive process contains a good faith requirement 
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The Third Circuit raised a similar concern in Williams, when it 
rejected the windfall argument and concluded that accommodations 
are required in “regarded as” cases.96  In echoing the Jacques court’s 
concerns, the court in Williams noted that individuals regarded as dis-
abled are not treated similarly to those who are not regarded as dis-
abled, and that “[t]he employee whose limitations are perceived ac-
curately gets to work, while [the plaintiff whose limitations are not 
perceived correctly] is sent home unpaid.  This is precisely the type of 
discrimination the ‘regarded as’ prong literally protects from, as con-
firmed by the Supreme Court’s decision in Arline and the legislative 
history of the ADA.”97 
More recently, the Tenth Circuit also rejected this argument in 
Kelly, concluding that it “fail[ed] to understand” the Eighth and 
Ninth Circuits on this issue.98  In addition to acknowledging its failure 
to understand the Eighth and Ninth Circuits’ concerns, the Kelly 
court raised another argument in favor of requiring accommoda-
tions: employers who are unwilling to change their views about whom 
they regard as disabled should bear the responsibility of accommo-
dating the limitations imposed by those alleged disabilities.99  The 
Tenth Circuit observed that when an employer is unwilling to shed 
these inaccurate stereotypes, it “must be prepared to accommodate 
the artificial limitations created by [its] own faulty perceptions.”100 
Thus, while some courts have used the windfall argument to 
support the conclusion that accommodations are not required in 
cases involving individuals regarded as disabled, other courts have re-
jected that argument.  The rejection of this argument, combined with 
the Supreme Court’s opinion in Arline, the ADA’s plain language, 
purposes, legislative history, and interactive process, have all played a 
role in some courts’ conclusions that accommodations are required 
in cases involving individuals regarded as disabled.  However, as this 
Article will now address, there are several arguments on the other 
side of this issue—that the ADA does not require accommodations in 
cases involving individuals regarded as disabled. 
 
and that this requirement would shield employers from this type of concern.  Id. at 
170–71. 
 96 Williams, 380 F.3d at 775–76. 
 97 Id. 
 98 See Kelly v. Metallics W., Inc., 410 F.3d 670, 676 (10th Cir. 2005); see also 
D’Angelo, 422 F.3d at 1237–39 (rejecting the windfall argument accepted by the 
Eighth and Ninth Circuits). 
 99 Kelly, 410 F.3d at 676. 
 100 Id. 
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III. THE ARGUMENTS AGAINST REQUIRING ACCOMMODATIONS IN 
“REGARDED AS” CASES 
Just as several courts have found reasons to conclude that ac-
commodations are required in “regarded as” cases, there are several 
other courts that have determined that accommodations are not re-
quired in such cases.  Among the explanations these courts have used 
to reach this conclusion are the allegedly ambiguous text of the ADA 
and the interpretation of the EEOC’s regulations on this issue, some 
portions of the ADA’s legislative history, the windfall argument, the 
public policy argument, the common sense argument, and an argu-
ment based on the EEOC’s position.  Regardless of which reason, or 
combination of reasons, they use, many courts to address this issue 
have concluded that accommodations are not required in these cases. 
A. Allegedly Ambiguous Text of the ADA 
As discussed previously, courts that have concluded that the ADA 
requires accommodations for individuals regarded as disabled relied 
on the ADA’s plain language and its failure to distinguish between 
the three prongs of the disability definition.101  These courts believe 
that the ADA’s plain language is clear, and that there is no reason to 
treat an individual differently, depending on which disability defini-
tion the individual satisfies.102  Even most courts that have concluded 
that individuals regarded as disabled are not entitled to accommoda-
tions conceded that following the ADA’s plain language would re-
quire accommodations in these cases.103 
There is, however, at least some authority that the ADA’s lan-
guage is not so clear, and that when read in conjunction with the 
EEOC’s regulations implementing Title I of the ADA and with por-
tions of the ADA’s legislative history, the outcome for this issue 
should be that individuals regarded as disabled should not receive 
accommodations.  Specifically, in Fontanilla v. City and County of San 
Francisco,104 the United States District Court for the Northern District 
of California concluded that an employee who was regarded as dis-
 
 101 See, e.g., D’Angelo, 422 F.3d at 1235–36; Kelly, 410 F.3d at 676; Williams, 380 F.3d 
at 774; Jacques, 200 F. Supp. 2d at 166. 
 102 See, e.g., D’Angelo, 422 F.3d at 1235–36; Kelly, 410 F.3d at 676; Williams, 380 F.3d 
at 774; Jacques, 200 F. Supp. 2d at 166. 
 103 Weber v. Strippit, Inc., 186 F.3d 907, 917 (8th Cir. 1999); Kaplan v. City of N. 
Las Vegas, 323 F.3d 1226, 1232 (9th Cir. 2003). 
 104 No. C-96-3916 JCS, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6919 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 28, 2001). 
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abled was not entitled to an accommodation.105  The plaintiff in Fon-
tanilla sued his employer for several causes of action, including two 
claims under the ADA.106  After the court addressed the plaintiff’s 
“disparate treatment” claim, the court addressed the plaintiff’s sec-
ond claim, which was based on the employer’s failure to accommo-
date.107  It was during this discussion that the court reached the con-
clusion that the ADA’s language was not clear as to whether 
individuals regarded as disabled were entitled to ADA accommoda-
tions, and that it was therefore appropriate to look to other sources 
of statutory interpretation.108  This interpretation of the ADA’s text as 
ambiguous conflicts with just about all other courts, even those hold-
ing that accommodations are not required in these cases.109 
After first acknowledging the split of authority, the Fontanilla 
court began its analysis by looking to the ADA’s language.110  Accord-
ing to the court, the language was not as clear as the other courts to 
decide this issue had concluded, as “the definition of discrimination 
fails to address whether an employer must accommodate any limita-
tions that burden a worker whom the ADA classifies as ‘disabled’ or 
whether the employer need only accommodate those limitations that 
arise as a result of the worker’s statutorily defined ‘disability.’”111  The 
court also noted that the definition “fails to address whether the 
‘known . . . limitations’ include perceived limitations that do not in fact 
exist.”112  Finally, the court noted that no other ADA provisions explic-
itly addressed those issues.113  Therefore, the court found the ADA was 
ambiguous regarding this issue.114 
The court next analyzed the provision of the ADA indicating 
that the statute’s purpose was to create a level playing field in the 
workplace and concluded that requiring employers to accommodate 
 
 105 Id.  Since Fontanilla, the Ninth Circuit has ruled that accommodations are not 
required for individuals regarded as disabled under the ADA; however, the Ninth 
Circuit did not follow the reasoning articulated by the district court in Fontanilla.  
Kaplan, 323 F.3d at 1236. 
 106 Fontanilla, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6919, at *4. 
 107 Id. at *41. 
 108 Id. at *46–56. 
 109 For example, in both Weber v. Strippit, Inc., 186 F.3d 907, 917 (8th Cir. 1999), 
and Kaplan, 323 F.3d at 1232, the courts agreed that the ADA’s language was clear 
and that it did not distinguish between individuals with actual disabilities and indi-
viduals regarded as being disabled. 
 110 Fontanilla, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6919, at *47–48. 
 111 Id. at *48. 
 112 Id. (alteration in original). 
 113 Id. 
 114 Id. at *48–49. 
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some non-actually disabled employees and not other non-disabled 
employees frustrated that goal.115  Therefore, the court concluded 
that the ADA’s language suggests that accommodations are not re-
quired in “regarded as” cases.116  After addressing the statutory lan-
guage, the court further supported its conclusion by reference to the 
EEOC regulations and guidelines regarding this issue and some por-
tions of the ADA’s legislative history.117 
B. The EEOC’s Regulations and Interpretive Guidelines 
Although most courts have not resorted to evaluating the 
EEOC’s regulations and interpretive guidelines, the court in Fon-
tanilla supported its conclusion that accommodations are not re-
quired in “regarded as” cases by doing so.118  Although these sources 
do not directly address this issue, the Fontanilla court used them to 
bolster its holding that accommodations are not required.119  The 
court pointed to three separate provisions to reach this conclusion. 
The first provision to which the court turned was the appendix 
to 29 C.F.R. § 1630.9, which states that “an individual with a disability 
is ‘otherwise qualified’ . . . if he or she is qualified for a job, except 
that, because of the disability, he or she needs a reasonable accommoda-
tion.”120  The court then pointed out that the appendix also states that 
“employers are obligated to make reasonable accommodation only to 
the physical or mental limitations resulting from the disability of a qualified 
individual.”121  Finally, the Fontanilla court noted that the appendix 
states that “when a qualified individual with a disability has requested 
a reasonable accommodation . . . the employer . . . should  
. . . ascertain the precise job-related limitations imposed by the individ-
ual’s disability and how those limitations should be overcome with a 
reasonable accommodation.”122  The court read these provisions and 
concluded that the natural result of such a reading was that employ-
ers need not accommodate employees who are regarded as dis-
abled.123  The court next turned to portions of the ADA’s legislative 
history for further support. 
 
 115 Id. at *49–50. 
 116 Fontanilla, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6919, at *50. 
 117 Id. at *50–53. 
 118 Id. at *52–53. 
 119 Id. 
 120 Id. at *52 (citing 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.9 (1991)). 
 121 Id. (citing 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.9 (1991)) (emphasis added). 
 122 Fontanilla, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6919, at *52–53 (citing 29 C.F.R. app.  
§ 1630.9 (1991)). 
 123 Id. at *53. 
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C. Selected Portions of the ADA’s Legislative History 
Although many courts have found that the legislative history be-
hind the “regarded as” prong of the ADA’s disability definition sup-
ports the proposition that employers must accommodate individuals 
regarded as having disabilities,124 the court in Fontanilla reached the 
opposite conclusion.125  The court cited a house report discussing the 
“regarded as” prong and used that legislative history to reach its pro-
employer conclusion.126  In addition to the passage quoted in the 
footnote below,127 the Fontanilla court also observed that neither of 
the two examples provided in the house report involved accommoda-
tion issues.128  The two examples, one involving a cosmetic disfigure-
ment and the other involving an able-bodied worker with some type 
of anomaly, did not address the accommodation issue, which led the 
Fontanilla court to state that “[n]othing in the legislative history indi-
cates Congress gave even passing consideration to requiring employ-
ers to accommodate the limitations of workers ‘regarded as’ disabled 
who were not actually disabled.”129  Therefore, although many courts 
have used the legislative history behind the ADA to conclude that ac-
commodations are required for individuals regarded as disabled, the 
Fontanilla court used the legislative history to reach the opposite con-
clusion. 
Despite the several justifications the court in Fontanilla used to 
conclude that accommodations are not required in “regarded as” 
 
 124 D’Angelo v. ConAgra Foods, Inc., 422 F.3d 1220, 1237–39 (11th Cir. 2005); 
Williams v. Phila. Hous. Auth. Police Dep’t, 380 F.3d 751, 774 (3d Cir. 2004); Jacques 
v. DiMarzio, Inc., 200 F. Supp. 2d 151, 166–68 (E.D.N.Y. 2002). 
 125 Fontanilla, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6919, at *50–52. 
 126 Id. 
 127 The specific language from the House report states: 
The rationale for this third test (the “regarded as” prong) as used in 
the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, was articulated by the Supreme Court in 
School Board of Nassau County v. Arline.  The Court noted that, although 
an individual may have an impairment that does not substantially limit 
a major life activity, the reactions of others may prove just as disabling.  
“Such an impairment may not diminish a person’s physical or mental 
capabilities, but could nevertheless substantially limit that person’s abil-
ity to work as a result of the negative reactions of others to the impair-
ment.”  The Court concluded that, by including this test, “Congress ac-
knowledged that society’s accumulated myths and fears about disability 
and diseases are as handicapping as are the physical limitations that 
flow from actual impairment.” 
Id. at *50–51 (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 101-485, pt. 3 (1990), as reprinted in 1990 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 445, 453). 
 128 Id. at *51–52. 
 129 Id. 
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cases, the most popular justification for denying accommodations in 
these cases is the windfall argument, which will now be addressed. 
D. Windfall Argument 
One of the most common rationales for preventing individuals 
regarded as having disabilities from receiving accommodations is the 
argument that providing accommodations for these individuals pro-
duces a windfall, and that this produces a bizarre result.130  Although 
the courts that have followed this argument acknowledge that apply-
ing the plain language of the ADA would result in accommodations 
in “regarded as” cases, they nonetheless refuse to require accommo-
dations because such an outcome is, in their view, “bizarre.”131 
Two United States Courts of Appeals that have concluded ac-
commodations are not required in “regarded as” cases have both re-
lied on this argument: the Eighth Circuit in Weber v. Strippit, Inc.,132 
and the Ninth Circuit in Kaplan v. City of North Las Vegas.133  After not-
ing that reasonable accommodations are required in cases involving 
plaintiffs with actual disabilities, the Weber court noted that: 
 The reasonable accommodation requirement makes considera-
bly less sense in the perceived disability context.  Imposing liabil-
ity on employers who fail to accommodate non-disabled employ-
ees who are simply regarded as disabled would lead to bizarre 
results.  Assume, for instance, that [the plaintiff’s] heart condition 
prevented him from relocating . . . but did not substantially limit 
any major life activity.  Absent a perceived disability, defendants 
could terminate [the plaintiff] without exposing themselves to li-
ability under the ADA.  If the hypothetical is altered, however, 
such that defendants mistakenly perceive [the plaintiff’s] heart 
condition as substantially limiting one or more major life activi-
ties, defendants would be required to reasonably accommodate 
[the plaintiff’s] condition . . . . Although [the plaintiff’s] impair-
ment is no more severe in this example than in the first, [the 
plaintiff] would now be entitled to accommodations for a non-
 
 130 For example, the courts in Weber v. Strippit, Inc., 186 F.3d 907, 916–18 (8th Cir. 
1999), and Kaplan v. City of North Las Vegas, 323 F.3d 1226, 1232–33 (9th Cir. 2003), 
have followed the “bizarre results” argument to conclude that accommodations are 
not required in cases involving individuals regarded as disabled.  The courts do this 
because it is one way to ignore the plain language of a statute.  See Royal Foods Co. v. 
RJR Holdings, Inc., 252 F.3d 1102, 1108 (9th Cir. 2001) (noting that courts must 
look beyond the plain language of a statute if following the plain language would 
yield an absurd result). 
 131 Weber, 186 F.3d at 917; Kaplan, 323 F.3d at 1232–33. 
 132 186 F.3d 907 (8th Cir. 1999). 
 133 323 F.3d 1226 (9th Cir. 2003). 
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disabling impairment that no similarly situated employees would 
enjoy. 
 . . . . 
 The ADA cannot reasonably have been intended to create a dis-
parity in treatment among impaired but non-disabled employees, 
denying most the right to reasonable accommodations but grant-
ing to others, because of their employers’ misperceptions, a right 
to reasonable accommodations no more limited than those af-
forded actually disabled employees.134 
Four years later, when the Ninth Circuit was asked to address 
this issue, it relied on the windfall argument in Weber.135  After first 
noting that the ADA did not distinguish between actual disabilities 
and “regarded as” disabilities,136 the Ninth Circuit opined that the ab-
sence of a distinction between the different prongs of the disability 
definition was “not tantamount to an explicit instruction by Congress 
that ‘regarded as’ individuals are entitled to reasonable accommoda-
tions.”137  According to the court, “because a formalistic reading of 
the ADA in this context has been considered by some courts to lead 
to bizarre results,” it was necessary to look beyond the ADA’s literal 
language.138  The court relied on Weber to conclude that individuals 
regarded as disabled are not entitled to accommodations.139  The 
Ninth Circuit noted the problems such a reading would yield: 
 If we were to conclude that “regarded as” plaintiffs are entitled 
to reasonable accommodation, impaired employees would be bet-
ter off under the statute if their employers treated them as dis-
abled even if they were not.  This would be a perverse and trou-
bling result . . . .140 
Although acknowledging that this was not an “easy question” be-
cause of the ADA’s language, the Ninth Circuit concluded that ac-
commodations are not required for individuals regarded as dis-
abled.141  Weber and Kaplan are two examples of courts concluding 
 
 134 Weber, 186 F.3d at 916–17. 
 135 Kaplan, 323 F.3d at 1232. 
 136 Id. 
 137 Id.  As will be discussed later in this Article, the Eleventh Circuit specifically re-
jected this argument.  D’Angelo v. ConAgra Foods, Inc., 422 F.3d 1220, 1238–39 
(11th Cir. 2005). 
 138 Kaplan, 323 F.3d at 1232 (citing Weber, 186 F.3d at 917; Royal Foods Co. v. RJR 
Holdings, Inc., 252 F.3d 1102, 1108 (9th Cir. 2001) (noting that courts must look be-
yond the plain language of a statute if following the plain language would yield an 
absurd result)). 
 139 Id. 
 140 Id.   
 141 Kaplan, 323 F.3d at 1232–33. 
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that the windfall justification for denying accommodations out-
weighed the ADA’s language.  This justification for denying accom-
modations is not, however, the final one courts have used to rule in 
favor of employers on this issue.  As the next few sections of the Arti-
cle will demonstrate, there are still other reasons courts have decided 
this issue in favor of employers. 
E. Conflict with the ADA’s Purposes 
Courts have also used policy arguments when deciding that “re-
garded as” individuals are not entitled to accommodations.  Accord-
ing to these courts, the arguments are premised on two ideas: (1) en-
couraging equality in the workplace and dispelling false stereotypes 
regarding people with disabilities; and (2) preserving a company’s fi-
nancial resources for accommodations that actually disabled employ-
ees need rather than spending these resources on employees who are 
merely regarded as disabled.142 
On the issue of dispelling stereotypes about people with disabili-
ties, the Ninth Circuit in Kaplan reasoned that requiring accommoda-
tions for non-disabled employees would be “a perverse and troubling 
result under a statute aimed at decreasing ‘stereotypic assumptions 
not truly indicative of the individual ability of [people with disabili-
ties].’”143  The court observed, “[w]ere we to entitle ‘regarded as’ em-
ployees to reasonable accommodation, it would do nothing to en-
courage those employers to see their employees’ talents clearly; 
instead, it would improvidently provide those employees a windfall if 
they perpetuated their employers’ misperception of a disability.”144  
Thus, the Ninth Circuit believed that allowing accommodations in 
these cases would frustrate one of the ADA’s purposes.145 
With respect to the use of employer resources to provide ac-
commodations for individuals regarded as disabled, the court in Kap-
lan specifically identified this as one reason for not requiring ac-
commodations for such individuals.  The Ninth Circuit noted that 
“[t]o require accommodation for those not truly disabled would 
compel employers to waste resources unnecessarily, when the em-
 
 142 Id. at 1232. 
 143 Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(7)) (alteration in original). 
 144 Id. 
 145 As was mentioned earlier, another purpose of the ADA that courts believe 
would be frustrated by requiring accommodations for “regarded as” employees is 
that of creating a level playing field for all similarly-situated employees.  Fontanilla v. 
City and County of S.F., No. C-96-3916 JCS, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6919, *49 (N.D. 
Cal. Feb. 28, 2001). 
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ployers’ limited resources would be better spent assisting those per-
sons who are actually disabled and in genuine need of accommoda-
tion to perform to their potential.”146  This concern, however, should 
have been a non-issue, as the ADA requires that any accommodation 
an employee requests not pose an undue hardship.147 
Nonetheless, the Ninth Circuit provided two policy reasons why 
employers should not be required to accommodate individuals whom 
they regard as having a disability.  In addition to those reasons, and in 
addition to the ones discussed earlier, there is yet another reason 
some courts have denied accommodations in these cases—common 
sense. 
F. Common Sense 
At least two district courts have ruled against “regarded as” plain-
tiffs on this issue based on their perception that requiring accommo-
dations in these cases defies common sense.148  Although these courts 
did not provide detailed analysis for their opinions, they did ulti-
mately conclude that accommodations are not required in “regarded 
as” cases. 
In Cebertowicz v. Motorola Inc.,149 the Northern District of Illinois 
ruled against the plaintiff on her “regarded as” claim for two reasons.  
First, the plaintiff failed to present evidence that her employer re-
garded her as disabled.150  Second, the court followed the holdings 
from the Eighth and Fifth Circuits, which concluded that employers 
need not accommodate plaintiffs regarded as disabled.151  According 
to the Cebertowicz court, the plaintiff was “urging that [the defendant] 
be held liable for failing to accommodate a non-existent disability.  
That makes no sense . . . .”152  The court then referred to the Third Cir-
cuit’s footnote in Deane, in which that court pointed out the “consid-
erable force” to the argument that individuals regarded as disabled 
are not entitled to ADA accommodations.153  Ironically, the concern 
the Third Circuit expressed over this issue in Deane v. Pocono Medical 
 
 146 Kaplan, 323 F.3d at 1232. 
 147 See supra note 3. 
 148 Powers v. Tweco Prods., Inc., 206 F. Supp. 2d 1097 (D. Kan. 2002); Ceber-
towicz v. Motorola, Inc., 178 F. Supp. 2d 949 (N.D. Ill. 2001). 
 149 178 F. Supp. 2d 949 (N.D. Ill. 2001). 
 150 Id. at 953. 
 151 Id. at 953–54 (citing Weber v. Strippit, Inc., 186 F.3d 907, 917 (8th Cir. 1999); 
Newberry v. E. Tex. State Univ., 161 F.3d 276, 280 (5th Cir. 1998)). 
 152 Id. at 954 n.8 (emphasis added). 
 153 Id. (citing Deane v. Pocono Med. Ctr., 142 F.3d 138, 148–49 n.12 (3d Cir. 
1998)). 
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Center154 became irrelevant after its subsequent decision in Williams v. 
Philadelphia Housing Authority Police Department, in which it ruled that 
accommodations are required in “regarded as” cases.155 
The United States District Court for the District of Kansas also 
relied on the common sense argument in Powers v. Tweco Products, 
Inc.,156 where the court first determined that the plaintiff could not 
prove that her employer regarded her as disabled and then con-
cluded that even if the plaintiff had established this, she would not 
have been able to prevail on a failure to accommodate claim because 
the ADA does not require accommodations for “regarded as” em-
ployees.157  Specifically, when addressing why the ADA does not have 
such a requirement, the court stated, “[t]o begin with, common sense, if 
nothing else, would preclude plaintiff from claiming that she was not 
‘disabled’ but that she nonetheless was entitled to an accommodation 
for a nonexistent disability.”158  Thus, the courts in Powers and Ceber-
towicz agreed that common sense counsels against requiring accom-
modations in cases involving “regarded as” plaintiffs.159 
Therefore, courts have identified several reasons why individuals 
regarded as disabled are not entitled to reasonable accommodations.  
However, it is not just the federal courts that have reached this con-
clusion; the EEOC has also taken the position that accommodations 
are not required in such cases. 
G. The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission’s Position 
One agency responsible for implementing the ADA is the 
EEOC.160  Unfortunately for plaintiffs, this agency has decided that 
individuals regarded as disabled are not entitled to accommodations.  
Although this issue has not been specifically addressed in the Code of 
Federal Regulations or in the appendix to it,161 the agency has made 
its position clear in three separate places: (1) written opinions from 
 
 154 142 F.3d 138 (3d Cir. 1998). 
 155 Williams v. Phila. Hous. Auth. Police Dep’t, 380 F.3d 751, 776 (3d Cir. 2004). 
 156 206 F. Supp. 2d 1097 (D. Kan. 2002). 
 157 Id. at 1112–14. 
 158 Id. at 1114 (emphasis added). 
 159 Id.; Cebertowicz v. Motorola, Inc., 178 F. Supp. 2d 949 (N.D. Ill. 2001). 
 160 Congress delegated this authority to the EEOC in 42 U.S.C. §§ 12116, 12117 
(2000). 
 161 But see Fontanilla v. City and County of S.F., No. C-96-3916 JCS, 2001 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 6919, *52–53 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 28, 2001) (determining that the EEOC’s regula-
tions and guidelines indicate that accommodations are not required for individuals 
regarded as disabled). 
ROSENTHAL FINAL.DOC 3/6/2006  3:27:15 PM 
2006] ACCOMMODATIONS IN “REGARDED AS” CASES 919 
the agency;162 (2) an amicus brief filed in a case involving this issue;163 
and (3) the agency’s training manual.164  Some courts that have ruled 
in favor of employers have based their opinions on the EEOC’s posi-
tion, despite performing little analysis of it.165 
As this section of the Article has demonstrated, courts have re-
lied upon several arguments in determining that accommodations 
are not required in cases involving individuals regarded as disabled; 
however, as was discussed earlier, there are also many arguments why 
accommodations should be required.  In the Article’s next section, I 
will examine several opinions and explain how those courts reached 
their conclusions. 
IV. OPINIONS FROM THE UNITED STATES COURTS OF APPEALS AND THE 
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTS 
This section of the Article will highlight cases from the United 
States Courts of Appeals and from the United States District Courts 
that have addressed the issue of whether “regarded as” individuals are 
entitled to accommodations.  Despite the recent pronouncements 
from the Eleventh, Tenth, and Third Circuits, many courts to address 
this issue have held that individuals regarded as disabled are not enti-
tled to accommodations.  Unless and until the Supreme Court an-
swers this question, there will continue to be uncertainty surrounding 
this issue in jurisdictions where the court of appeals has not issued a 
definitive ruling. 
 
 162 Baldassarre v. Potter, EEOC Doc. No. 01A05157, 2003 WL 21372676, at *3 
(EEOC June 6, 2003); Adams v. Potter, EEOC Doc. No. 03A20060, 2002 WL 
31107277, at *3 (EEOC Sept. 13, 2002); Clair v. Apfel, EEOC Doc. No. 01961246, 
1998 WL 56612, at *2 (EEOC Feb. 4, 1998); Huddy v. Runyon, EEOC Doc. No. 
01953454, 1997 WL 348684, at *2 (EEOC June 19, 1997); Schultz v. Runyon, EEOC 
Doc. No. 05950724, 1996 WL 562981 at *10 (EEOC Sept. 26, 1996); Olsen v. Runyon, 
EEOC Doc. No. 01943977, 1995 WL 710567, at *6 (EEOC Nov. 29, 1995); 
Crisostomo v. Bentsen, EEOC Doc. No. 01933372, 1994 WL 745883, at *6 (EEOC 
Sept. 1, 1994); Bookspan v. Dalton, EEOC Doc. No. 01933202, 1995 WL 384514, at 
*4 (EEOC June 21, 1994); Howard v. Widnall, EEOC Doc. No. 01931905, 1994 WL 
747979, at *5 (EEOC May 12, 1994). 
 163 Derbis v. United States Shoe Corp., No. 94-2312, 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 27636 
(4th Cir. May 2, 1995). 
 164 Workman v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 165 F.3d 460, 467 (6th Cir. 1999) (citing EEOC 
Training Manual). 
 165 See id.  As discussed earlier, at least one court has interpreted the EEOC’s regu-
lations and guidelines in a manner denying reasonable accommodations for indi-
viduals regarded as disabled.  Fontanilla, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6919, at *52–53. 
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A. The First Circuit 
In Katz v. City Metal Co.,166 the United States Court of Appeals for 
the First Circuit addressed the issue of “regarded as” disabilities and 
reasonable accommodations.167  The Katz court did not squarely ad-
dress the issue, but did assume that such accommodations were re-
quired.168 
The plaintiff in Katz had worked as a salesman and customer re-
lations employee for approximately one year when he suffered a 
heart attack.169  Following several weeks of medical leave, the plaintiff 
was terminated, even after he had asked to be retained on a part-time 
basis, at a lower salary, and with any accommodations needed to allow 
him to work.170  As a result of being terminated, the plaintiff brought 
suit under the ADA and under the parallel state law.171  After the 
plaintiff presented his case, the defendant moved for judgment as a 
matter of law.172  One of the issues the defendant raised was whether 
the plaintiff established that he had a disability under the ADA.173  
The trial judge decided that the plaintiff had failed to prove that he 
had a disability within the meaning of the Act and that the defendant 
was entitled to judgment as a matter of law.174 
On appeal, the First Circuit quickly concluded that the trial 
judge was incorrect in finding that there was insufficient evidence of 
a disability.175  Relying on the ADA’s definition of disability and the 
EEOC’s definitions of “physical or mental impairment,”176 “substan-
tially limits,”177 and “major life activities,”178 the First Circuit disagreed 
 
 166 87 F.3d 26 (1st Cir. 1996). 
 167 Id. at 33–34. 
 168 Id. 
 169 Id. at 28. 
 170 Id. at 29. 
 171 Id. 
 172 Katz, 87 F.3d at 29. 
 173 Id. at 30–31. 
 174 Id. at 30. 
 175 Id. 
 176 The Code of Federal Regulations defines “physical or mental impairment” as: 
(1) Any physiological disorder, or condition, cosmetic disfigurement, 
or anatomical loss affecting one or more of the following body systems: 
neurological, musculoskeletal, special sense organs, respiratory (in-
cluding speech organs), cardiovascular, reproductive, digestive, genito-
urinary, hemic and lymphatic, skin, and endocrine; or 
(2) Any mental or psychological disorder, such as mental retardation, 
organic brain syndrome, emotional or mental illness, and specific 
learning disabilities. 
29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h) (2005). 
 177 The Code of Federal Regulations defines “substantially limits” as: 
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with the lower court’s decision179 for two reasons.  First, the court 
concluded that there was sufficient evidence to allow a jury to con-
clude that the plaintiff suffered from an actual disability.180  Second, 
and most important for purposes of this Article, the court concluded 
that the plaintiff also could have satisfied the “regarded as” prong of 
the ADA’s definition of disability.181  With respect to the “regarded as” 
issue, the court highlighted several pieces of evidence that created a 
genuine issue of fact, and noted that the district court did not ade-
quately address this argument when the plaintiff attempted to raise it; 
this mistake, the First Circuit concluded, justified reversal and re-
mand.182 
As was previously indicated, the First Circuit did not directly ad-
dress the issue of whether accommodations are required in “regarded 
as” cases.  The court did, however, suggest that accommodations are 
required in these cases.183  Specifically, the court observed: 
 Congress, when it provided for perception to be the basis of dis-
ability status, probably had principally in mind the more usual 
case in which a plaintiff has a long-term medical condition of 
some kind, and the employer exaggerates its significance by fail-
ing to make a reasonable accommodation.  But both the language 
and policy of the statute seem to us to offer protection as well to 
one who is not substantially disabled or even disabled at all but is 
wrongly perceived to be so.  And, of course, it may well be that 
[the plaintiff] was both actually disabled and perceived to be so.184 
Thus, the First Circuit indicated that individuals regarded as hav-
ing disabilities are entitled to the same protections as those with ac-
tual disabilities, and those protections include reasonable accommo-
 
(i) Unable to perform a major life activity that the average person in 
the general population can perform; or 
(ii) Significantly restricted as to the condition, manner or duration 
under which an individual can perform a particular major life activity 
as compared to the condition, manner, or duration under which the 
average person in the general population can perform that same major 
life activity. 
29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1) (2005). 
 178 The Code of Federal Regulations defines “major life activities” as: “functions 
such as caring for oneself, performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speak-
ing, breathing, learning, and working.”  29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i) (2005). 
 179 Katz, 87 F.3d at 31. 
 180 Id. at 33. 
 181 Id. 
 182 Id. 
 183 Id. 
 184 Id. 
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dations.185  Ultimately, the First Circuit concluded that the issue of 
whether the plaintiff would have been able to perform the essential 
functions of his position with a reasonable accommodation was a jury 
question.186 
After the opinion in Katz, several courts have concluded that the 
First Circuit understands the ADA to require accommodations for 
employees regarded as having disabilities.187  Five years after Katz, a 
district court within the First Circuit revisited the issue of whether in-
dividuals who are regarded as disabled are entitled to a reasonable 
accommodation in Jewell v. Reid’s Confectionary Co. 188 
In Jewell, the plaintiff sued his former employer under the ADA 
and other federal and state laws.189  The plaintiff had worked as a de-
livery driver for the defendant for several years before suffering two 
heart attacks that left him unable to drive.190  He requested another 
position within the company, but the company indicated that it “had 
nothing for him,” effectively terminating him.191  After receiving no-
tice of his right to sue from the EEOC and an analogous state agency, 
the plaintiff filed his multi-count complaint.192 
Addressing the arguments raised by the defendant in its motion 
to dismiss, the court found that although the plaintiff could not 
demonstrate that he was either actually disabled or that he had a re-
cord of being disabled, he could possibly prove that he was regarded 
as being disabled.193  The court then addressed the defendant’s ar-
gument that even if it regarded the plaintiff as disabled, it did not 
owe him a duty to accommodate that disability.194 The defendant’s ar-
gument relied primarily on Weber v. Strippit, Inc.,195 which had con-
cluded that these “regarded as” plaintiffs are not entitled to accom-
 
 185 Katz, 87 F.3d at 33. 
 186 Id. 
 187 Jewell v. Reid’s Confectionary Co., 172 F. Supp. 2d 212, 219 (D. Me. 2001).  
The Courts of Appeals that read Katz this way include the United States Courts of 
Appeals for the Eleventh, Tenth, Third and Eighth Circuits.  D’Angelo v. ConAgra 
Foods, Inc., 422 F.3d 1220, 1235 (11th Cir. 2005); Kelly v. Metallics W., Inc., 410 F.3d 
670, 675–76 (10th Cir. 2005); Williams v. Phila. Hous. Auth. Police Dep’t, 380 F.3d 
751, 773 (3d Cir. 2004); Weber v. Strippit, Inc., 186 F.3d 907, 916–17 (8th Cir. 1999). 
 188 172 F. Supp. 2d at 218–19. 
 189 Id. at 215. 
 190 Id. at 214–15. 
 191 Id. at 215. 
 192 Id. 
 193 Id. at 216–17. 
 194 Jewell, 172 F. Supp. 2d at 218–219. 
 195 186 F.3d 907 (8th Cir. 1999). 
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modations.196  The court in Jewell rejected this argument for several 
reasons.  First, it relied on Katz for the proposition that individuals 
regarded as disabled are entitled to accommodations,197 despite rec-
ognizing that the First Circuit “did not engage in a substantive analy-
sis of the legislation and case law.”198  Because the First Circuit held 
that the issue of whether the plaintiff in Katz could have performed 
his job with accommodations could have reached the jury, the Jewell 
court concluded that such accommodations are allowed in “regarded 
as” cases.199 
The Jewell court disagreed with the Eighth Circuit’s reasoning in 
Weber.200  The court noted that it “[could not] agree with Weber that 
the disparity in treatment between non-disabled employees whom an 
employer perceives as disabled, and those whom it does not perceive 
as disabled, is of sufficient concern to foreclose” a “regarded as” 
plaintiff’s claim.201  The court also took note of the ADA’s interactive 
process, which requires an employer to engage in a dialogue with an 
employee to determine the extent of his limitations and the possible 
accommodations available to him.202  This, the court reasoned, fur-
ther supported the idea that “regarded as” plaintiffs are entitled to 
accommodations.203  In the court’s view, if an employer does not en-
gage in this process, but rather takes some type of adverse action 
against the employee, there is nothing “bizarre” about finding an 
ADA violation.204 
Finally, the court concluded that one purpose of the ADA was to 
punish employers for making “stereotypic” assumptions about an in-
dividual and his abilities, and that not requiring accommodations in 
this situation would run counter to that goal.205  As a result, the court 
determined that plaintiffs regarded as disabled were entitled to ac-
commodations.206 
 
 196 Jewell, 172 F. Supp. 2d at 218 (citing Weber, 186 F.3d at 917; Newberry v. E. Tex. 
State Univ., 161 F.3d 276, 280 (5th Cir. 1998); Fontanilla v. City and County of S.F., 
No. C-96-3916 JCS, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6919, *15 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 28, 2001)). 
 197 Id. 
 198 Id. 
 199 Id. 
 200 Id. at 218–19. 
 201 Id. at 218–19. 
 202 Jewell, 172 F. Supp. 2d at 219.  This interactive process was discussed in detail 
earlier in this Article in Section II.C. 
 203 Jewell, 172 F. Supp. 2d at 219; see also Jacques v. DiMarzio, Inc., 200 F. Supp. 2d 
151, 169 (E.D.N.Y. 2002). 
 204 Jewell, 172 F. Supp. 2d at 219. 
 205 Id. 
 206 Id. 
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Although it never confronted the issue directly, the First Circuit 
does require employers to accommodate individuals whom they re-
gard as disabled.  Similar to the First Circuit, the Second Circuit has 
also failed to engage in a thorough discussion of this issue; however, 
one court within the Second Circuit has issued a comprehensive ex-
planation as to why it believes these plaintiffs should be accommo-
dated. 
B. The Second Circuit 
Although the United States Court of Appeals for the Second 
Circuit has not directly addressed this issue, one of the most often-
cited cases for the proposition that the ADA requires accommoda-
tions for plaintiffs regarded as disabled comes from a district court 
within the Second Circuit.  Specifically, the opinion in Jacques v. Di-
Marzio, Inc.,207 from the Eastern District of New York, is one of the 
cases most pro-plaintiff courts cite when concluding that the ADA re-
quires accommodations in “regarded as” cases.208 
In Jacques, after first denying the defendant’s motion for sum-
mary judgment on a separate issue, the Eastern District of New York 
decided sua sponte to address this issue of whether a plaintiff re-
garded as disabled is entitled to an accommodation.209  Neither party 
had raised the issue at the initial summary judgment stage, but after 
the court learned of Weber v. Strippit, Inc.210 from the Eighth Circuit, it 
decided to address this issue.211 
In Jacques, the plaintiff, who suffered from psychiatric problems 
such as depression and bipolar disorder, was terminated after she ex-
perienced difficulties getting along with co-workers and expressed 
 
 207 200 F. Supp. 2d 151 (E.D.N.Y. 2002). 
 208 Interestingly, the Second Circuit has had two occasions post-Jacques to decide 
whether the ADA requires accommodations for individuals regarded as disabled.  In 
both cases, however, the Second Circuit decided not to answer the question.  Cam-
eron v. Cmty. Aid for Retarded Children, Inc., 335 F.3d 60, 64 (2d Cir. 2003); Shan-
non v. New York City Transit Auth., 332 F.3d 95, 104–05 (2d Cir. 2003).  The court in 
Shannon did, however, express doubt about whether such an accommodation would 
be necessary.  Unlike the Second Circuit, the United States District Court for the 
Eastern District of New York followed the Jacques opinion and concluded that indi-
viduals regarded as disabled are, in fact, entitled to accommodations.  Specifically, in 
Lorinz v. Turner Construction Co., No. 00 CV 6123SJ, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 28825, at 
*22–23 (E.D.N.Y. May 25, 2004), the court decided to follow Jacques and deny the de-
fendant’s motion for summary judgment.  With respect to this particular issue, the 
court noted that it found “Judge Block’s reasoning in Jacques persuasive that ‘re-
garded as’ disabled plaintiffs are entitled to accommodations under the ADA.”  Id. 
 209 Jacques, 200 F. Supp. 2d at 169. 
 210 186 F.3d 907 (8th Cir. 1999). 
 211 Jacques, 200 F. Supp. 2d at 169. 
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numerous safety concerns to her employer.212  She had also discussed 
the possibility of working from home; however, her former employer 
rejected this option.213  At the initial summary judgment stage, the 
court focused its attention on whether the plaintiff was able to estab-
lish that she did, indeed, have a disability.214  The court concluded 
that although the plaintiff was unable to establish that she had an ac-
tual disability or that she had a record of having a disability, the 
plaintiff was able to create a genuine issue of fact with respect to 
whether she was regarded as having a disability.215 
The plaintiff argued that her employer regarded her as being 
substantially limited in the ability to interact with others.216  Although 
the Second Circuit had never answered the question of whether in-
teracting with others was indeed a major life activity,217 the court 
agreed with the Ninth Circuit’s conclusion that it is.218  The court was 
careful to note, however, that in order to satisfy this aspect of an ADA 
claim, a plaintiff must show more than “trouble getting along with 
coworkers”; she must show high levels of hostility, social withdrawal, 
and severe problems.219  Applying that standard to the plaintiff’s case, 
the court concluded that there was at least a genuine issue of material 
fact regarding this issue.220  The court then determined that there was 
a triable issue of fact regarding whether the plaintiff could have per-
formed her job with a reasonable accommodation.221  As was noted 
earlier, however, the court did not initially address the precise issue 
of accommodations for “regarded as” plaintiffs.  However, after learn-
ing of the Weber opinion, the court decided to address the issue.222 
 
 212 Id. at 154–55. 
 213 Id. at 155. 
 214 Id. at 156–61. 
 215 Id. at 161–62. 
 216 Id. at 159. 
 217 Jacques, 200 F. Supp. 2d at 160. 
 218 Id. (citing McAlindin v. County of San Diego, 192 F.3d 1226, 1234 (9th Cir. 
1999)). 
 219 Id. at 160. 
 220 Id. at 161. 
 221 Id. 
 222 Id. at 163. 
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The court started this analysis by quoting Weber223 and observing 
that there was a split of authority on this issue.224  The court also ac-
knowledged that Weber “sweeps broadly” and would eliminate ac-
commodations in all “regarded as” cases.225  After acknowledging that 
most courts disfavored requiring accommodations in these cases, the 
court concluded that such plaintiffs are entitled to reasonable ac-
commodations.226  The court did this for several reasons: (1) the 
ADA’s plain language; (2) the ADA’s legislative history, along with 
the Supreme Court’s decision in School Board of Nassau County v. Ar-
line;227 (3) the mandatory interactive process referred to by the EEOC 
and discussed in the ADA’s legislative history; and (4) the Eighth Cir-
cuit’s faulty reasoning in Weber.228 
First, with very little discussion, the court concluded that the 
ADA’s plain language does not distinguish between those who are ac-
tually disabled and those who are regarded as disabled.229  Construing 
the Act’s definition of “qualified individual,”  the court concluded 
that because the term does not treat “regarded as” individuals any dif-
ferently than actually disabled individuals, no such difference in 
treatment was required.230  The court also noted that several other 
courts had acknowledged that the ADA does not distinguish between 
actually disabled and “regarded as” individuals, yet they still came to 
the conclusion that accommodations are not required in “regarded 
 
 223 Jacques, 200 F. Supp. 2d at 164.  The specific language to which the Jacques 
court referred is the following: 
[i]mposing liability on employers who fail to accommodate non-
disabled employees who are simply regarded as disabled would lead to 
bizarre results.  Assume, for instance, that [plaintiff’s] heart condition 
prevented him from relocating . . . but did not substantially limit any 
major life activity.  Absent a perceived disability, defendants could ter-
minate [plaintiff] without exposing themselves to liability under the 
ADA.  If the hypothetical is altered, however, such that defendants mis-
takenly perceive [plaintiff’s] heart condition as substantially limiting 
one or more major life activities, defendants would be required to rea-
sonably accommodate [plaintiff’s] condition by, for instance, delaying 
his relocation . . . . Although [plaintiff’s] impairment is no more severe 
in this example than in the first, [plaintiff] would now be entitled to 
accommodations for a non-disabling impairment that no similarly situ-
ated employee would enjoy. 
Id. (quoting Weber, 186 F.3d at 916) (alterations in original). 
 224 Id. at 164–66. 
 225 Id. at 164. 
 226 Id. at 166. 
 227 480 U.S. 273 (1987). 
 228 Jacques, 200 F. Supp. 2d at 166. 
 229 Id. 
 230 Id. 
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as” cases.231  In support of its opposite conclusion, the Jacques court re-
iterated its view that the ADA’s plain language supports accommoda-
tions in these cases. 
After addressing the plain language, the court focused on the 
ADA’s legislative history.232  The court noted that this legislative his-
tory focused on the Supreme Court’s decision in Arline,233 which con-
cluded that societal perceptions and their effect on society’s treat-
ment of plaintiffs regarded as disabled could be just as disabling as 
actual disabilities.234  In Arline, the Supreme Court concluded that the 
plaintiff was entitled to a remand on the accommodation issue, de-
spite the fact that she was not “actually” handicapped.235  In light of 
this legislative history and the holding in Arline, the Jacques court ob-
served that the “‘regarded as’ prong of the disability definition is 
based upon the reality that the perception of disability, socially con-
 
 231 Id.  The court relied on Taylor v. Pathmark Stores, Inc., 177 F.3d 180, 196 (3d 
Cir. 1999), and Deane v. Pocono Medical Center, 142 F.3d 138, 147 (3d Cir. 1998), for 
the proposition that the plain language does not distinguish between individuals who 
are actually disabled and those who are regarded as disabled.  In its plain language 
argument, the court also relied on Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 340 (1997), 
for the proposition that “the first step in interpreting a statute ‘is to determine 
whether the language at issue has a plain and unambiguous meaning with regard to 
the particular dispute in the case.’” 
 232 Jacques, 200 F. Supp. 2d at 166–68. 
 233 Id. at 166–67 (citing Sch. Bd. of Nassau County v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 274 
(1987)).  The court focused on the House report, which relied on Arline and ex-
pressed the rationale behind the ADA’s “regarded as” prong: 
The Court [in Arline] noted that although an individual may have an 
impairment that does not in fact substantially limit a major life activity, 
the reaction of others may prove just as disabling.  “Such an impair-
ment might not diminish a person’s physical or mental capabilities, but 
could nevertheless substantially limit that person’s ability to work as a 
result of the negative reactions of others to the impairment.” 
The Court concluded that, by including this test, “Congress ac-
knowledged that society’s accumulated myths and fears about disability 
and diseases are as handicapping as are the physical limitations that 
flow from actual impairment.” 
Thus, a person who [suffers an adverse employment action] be-
cause of the myths, fears and stereotypes associated with disabilities 
would be covered under [the “regarded as” prong], whether or not the 
employer’s perception was shared by others in the field and whether or 
not the person’s physical or mental condition would be considered a 
disability under the first or second part of the definition. 
Sociologists have identified common barriers that frequently result 
in employers excluding disabled persons.  These include concerns re-
garding . . . acceptance by co-workers and customers. 
Id. at 166–67 (second, third, and fourth alterations in original) (quoting H.R. REP. 
NO. 101-485, pt. 3 (1990), as reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 445, 453). 
 234 Arline, 480 U.S. at 284. 
 235 Id. at 289. 
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structed and reinforced, is difficult to destroy, and in most cases, 
merely informing the employer of its misperception will not be 
enough to eliminate the limitation . . . .”236  Thus, the court con-
cluded, “failure to mandate reasonable accommodations would un-
dermine the role the ADA plays in ferreting out disability discrimina-
tion in employment.”237 
Before ending its discussion of the ADA’s legislative history, the 
court in Jacques provided two hypotheticals to further explain why in-
dividuals who are “regarded as” disabled should be entitled to ac-
commodations.238  In both hypotheticals, the plaintiffs were denied 
accommodations, even though their physical or mental impairments 
(which were not sufficient to satisfy the actual disability prong) 
caused co-workers to refuse to work with them and caused the em-
ployees to be fired.239  Under Weber, as interpreted by the Jacques 
court, these terminations would have been acceptable, even though 
the plaintiffs were terminated as a direct result of their coworkers’ 
stereotypes and fears.240  According to the Jacques court, this could not 
have been an outcome Congress intended.241 
 
 236 Jacques, 200 F. Supp. 2d at 167 (quoting Deane, 142 F.3d at 148 n.12) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
 237 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Deane, 142 F.3d at 148 n.12).  
The court also relied on the Supreme Court’s recent opinion in U.S. Airways, Inc. v. 
Barnett, 535 U.S. 391 (2002), in which the Court noted that the ADA “seeks to dimin-
ish or to eliminate the stereotypical thought processes, the thoughtless actions, and 
the hostile reactions that far too often bar those with disabilities from participating 
fully in the Nation’s life, including the workplace.”  Id. at 401.  The Court continued, 
“[t]hese objectives demand unprejudiced thought and reasonable responsive reac-
tion on the part of employers and fellow workers alike.”  Id. 
 238 The specific examples the Jacques court gave were the following: 
1) Plaintiff A, a police officer, has a mild form of multiple sclero-
sis.  Even though he is not disabled under the ADA, his employer has 
learned of the impairment and mistakenly believes that it substantially 
limits his ability to work.  Many of his fellow officers also know of the 
impairment, and as a consequence, refuse to work with him for fear 
that he will be an unreliable partner.  He is fired. 
2) Plaintiff B, an office worker, has a mild form of schizophrenia.  
Even though she is not disabled under the ADA, her employer has 
learned of the impairment and mistakenly believes that it substantially 
limits her ability to interact with others.  Many of her co-workers also 
know of the impairment, and as a consequence, believe her to be 
“crazy.”  She is unable to interact with her co-workers because of their 
attitudes and is fired. 
Jacques, 200 F. Supp. 2d at 167–68. 
 239 Id. at 168. 
 240 Id. 
 241 Id. 
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The court concluded its discussion of the legislative history by 
noting that “[c]ategorically denying reasonable accommodations to 
‘regarded as’ plaintiffs would allow the prejudices and biases of oth-
ers to impermissibly deny an impaired employee his or her job be-
cause of the mistaken perception that the employee suffers from an 
actual disability.  This is the concern addressed by Congress, but ig-
nored by Weber.”242 
The next reason the Jacques court gave for requiring accommo-
dations for “regarded as” plaintiffs was the interactive process Con-
gress and the EEOC mentioned when addressing accommodations 
and the ADA.243  Most courts, Jacques noted, have concluded that this 
interactive process is mandatory.244  According to Jacques, the process 
is triggered when the employer has reason to know that an employee 
might have a disability.245  This is further evidence that even those em-
ployees without actual disabilities are entitled to accommodation.246  
The court then went on to echo the argument discussed earlier in 
Section II.C of this Article.247 
The final reason the Jacques court offered in  support of its con-
clusion that employers are required to accommodate employees who 
are regarded as disabled was the specific criticism of Weber.248  In criti-
cizing Weber, the Jacques court questioned the Eighth Circuit’s heavy 
reliance on Deane v. Pocono Medical Center.249  In Deane, the Third Cir-
cuit indicated there was “considerable force” to the argument that 
individuals who were “regarded as” disabled were not entitled to ac-
 
 242 Id. 
 243 Id.  See also 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(3) (2005) (“To determine the appropriate 
reasonable accommodation it may be necessary for the covered entity to initiate an 
informal, interactive process with the qualified individual with a disability in need of 
the accommodation.  This process should identify the precise limitations resulting 
from the disability and potential reasonable accommodations that could overcome 
those limitations.”). 
 244 Jacques, 200 F. Supp. 2d at 168 (citing Barnett v. U.S. Airways, Inc., 228 F.3d 
1105, 1112 (9th Cir. 2000), rev’d on other grounds, 535 U.S. 391 (2002); Smith v. Mid-
land Brake, Inc., 180 F.3d 1154, 1172 (10th Cir. 1999)). 
 245 Jacques, 200 F. Supp. 2d at 169. 
 246 Id.; see Jewell v. Reid’s Confectionary Co., 172 F. Supp. 2d 212, 218–19 (D. Me. 
2001). 
 247 The court also relied on Taylor v. Phoenixville School District, 184 F.3d 296, 314 
(3d Cir. 1999) (en banc), for the proposition that because the interactive process is 
triggered once the employer believes than an employee might have a disability, this is 
sufficient evidence to prove that accommodations are required for individuals re-
garded as having disabilities.  Jacques, 200 F. Supp. 2d at 169. 
 248 Jacques, 200 F. Supp. 2d at 170. 
 249 142 F.3d 138 (3d Cir. 1998). 
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commodations, but it declined to answer that question.250  Addition-
ally, the Jacques court criticized Weber’s reliance on Taylor v. Pathmark 
Stores, Inc.,251 which, although it suggested that allowing accommoda-
tions in “regarded as” cases was “odd,” acknowledged that the Third 
Circuit had not yet resolved this particular issue.252 
In addition, the Jacques court took issue with Weber’s conclusion 
that applying the ADA’s plain language would yield a “bizarre re-
sult.”253  According to the Weber court, following the plain language 
would yield a “bizarre result” because similarly situated employees 
would be treated differently based on their employers’ perceptions.254  
Jacques rejected the “bizarre result” contention because “an employee 
who is simply impaired and an employee who is impaired and ‘re-
garded as’ disabled are not similarly situated,” and thus it is not bi-
zarre to treat those two individuals differently.255  The court contin-
ued by stating those who are impaired and regarded as being 
substantially limited in a major life activity are “subject to the stigma 
of the disabling and discriminatory attitudes of others.”256  Thus, ac-
cording to Jacques, it is not bizarre to grant these individuals accom-
modations, nor do such accommodations provide windfalls.257 
The Jacques court’s final response to Weber addressed the Eighth 
Circuit’s concern that employees might use the ADA to make de-
mands on their employers for accommodations when such accom-
modations were not necessary for the employees to perform the es-
sential functions of their positions.258  To rebut that concern, 
however, the Jacques court relied on the ADA’s good faith require-
ment and its provision prohibiting compensatory and punitive dam-
ages against employers who engage in the interactive process in good 
faith.259 
 
 250 The Third Circuit eventually rejected these concerns and ultimately concluded 
that accommodations are required in these cases.  Williams v. Phila. Hous. Auth. Po-
lice Dep’t, 380 F.3d 751, 772–76 (3d Cir. 2004). 
 251 177 F.3d 180 (3d Cir. 1999). 
 252 Jacques, 200 F. Supp. 2d at 165 (citing Taylor, 177 F.3d at 195–96). 
 253 Id. 
 254 Id. 
 255 Id. 
 256 Id. 
 257 Id. at 170; see supra Section III.D for an explanation of the “windfall” argument. 
 258 Jacques, 200 F. Supp. 2d at 170–71. 
 259 Id. at 170 n.2 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(a)(3) (2000)).  In another case from a 
United States District Court within the Second Circuit, Lorinz v. Turner Construction 
Co., No. 00 CV 6123SJ, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 28825 (E.D.N.Y. May 25, 2004), the 
court followed Judge Block’s reasoning in Jacques and concluded that individuals who 
are regarded as having a disability are, indeed, entitled to reasonable accommoda-
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Despite the extensive opinion in Jacques, the Second Circuit has 
not yet given a direct answer to this issue. 
C. The Third Circuit 
Unlike the Second Circuit, which despite Jacques has yet to be-
come embroiled in this debate, the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit has a unique history of dealing with this issue.  
The Third Circuit has addressed the “regarded as” issue more than 
once,260 and has finally decided that plaintiffs regarded as having dis-
abilities are entitled to accommodations.261  Before reaching the con-
clusion that accommodations are required in these cases, the Third 
Circuit delayed deciding this issue on several occasions.262  Until it de-
cided Williams, the Third Circuit’s most cited opinion was Deane v. Po-
cono Medical Center,263 in which the court hinted that “regarded as” in-
dividuals were not entitled to accommodations.264  The Third Circuit 
eventually rejected its earlier dicta from Deane, ultimately concluding 
in Williams that these individuals are entitled to accommodations.265 
In Deane, the plaintiff was terminated after she suffered an injury 
while working as a nurse.266  After attempting to recuperate, the plain-
tiff asked to return to her position, but was denied an accommoda-
tion and released.267  Before the district court, the plaintiff argued 
that she had an actual disability, that she was “regarded as” having a 
disability, and that the employer failed to accommodate her.268  The 
district court granted summary judgment in favor of the employer, 
and the plaintiff appealed.269  On appeal, she argued only that she was 
“regarded as” having a disability.270  The court first addressed whether 
 
tions under the ADA.  Id. at *23 n.7.  In Lorinz, the court denied the former em-
ployer’s motion for summary judgment, concluding that there were genuine issues of 
material fact with respect to whether the plaintiff was regarded as having a disability 
and whether the plaintiff could have performed the essential functions of her job 
with a reasonable accommodation.  Id. at *14, 22–23. 
 260 See Taylor v. Phoenixville Sch. Dist., 184 F.3d 296 (3d Cir. 1999); Deane v. Po-
cono Med. Ctr., 142 F.3d 138 (3d Cir. 1998). 
 261 Williams v. Phila. Hous. Auth. Police Dep’t, 380 F.3d 751, 776 (3d Cir. 2004). 
 262 Buskirk v. Apollo Metals, 307 F.3d 160, 168 n.2 (3d Cir. 2002); Taylor, 184 F.3d 
at 306; Deane, 142 F.3d at 148; see also Ruhle v. Hous. Auth. of Pittsburgh, 54 F. App’x 
61, 62–63 (3d Cir. 2002). 
 263 142 F.3d 138 (3d Cir. 1998). 
 264 Id. at 148 n.12. 
 265 Williams, 380 F.3d at 775–76. 
 266 Deane, 142 F.3d at 141. 
 267 Id. 
 268 Id. at 141–42. 
 269 Id. 
 270 Id. at 142. 
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the plaintiff had created a genuine issue of fact as to whether her 
employer regarded her as disabled.271  Relying on EEOC regula-
tions,272 and on the idea that “‘society’s accumulated myths and fears 
about disability and diseases are as handicapping as are the physical 
limitations that flow from actual impairment,’”273 the court concluded 
that the plaintiff created a genuine issue of fact as to whether her 
employer regarded her as disabled.274 
The court next addressed whether the plaintiff created a genu-
ine issue of material fact regarding whether she was a qualified indi-
vidual.275  Once again disagreeing with the district court, the Third 
Circuit concluded that to prove this element, the plaintiff only 
needed to show that she could have performed the essential functions 
of her position with or without reasonable accommodations.276  The 
plaintiff’s former employer had argued that she needed to prove that 
she could have performed all of her job functions, but the Third Cir-
cuit, relying on the ADA’s plain language, concluded that the plain-
tiff only needed to prove that she could have performed the essential 
functions of her position.277 
Finally, the court addressed whether the plaintiff was able to 
create a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether she could 
have performed the essential functions of her former position with-
out an accommodation.278  After reviewing the evidence presented at 
the summary judgment stage, the Third Circuit concluded that there 
was indeed a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the plaintiff 
was a “qualified individual” under the ADA and that summary judg-
ment was therefore inappropriate.279  However, it was during this last 
part of the Third Circuit’s discussion that the court opined on 
whether “regarded as” plaintiffs are entitled to accommodations. 
Specifically, in footnote twelve, the Third Circuit acknowledged 
that it was not going to answer “the more difficult question” of 
whether individuals regarded as having disabilities are entitled to 
 
 271 Id. at 143–45. 
 272 See supra note 5. 
 273 Deane, 142 F.3d at 143 (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 101-485, at 30 (1990), as reprinted 
in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 445, 453). 
 274 Id. at 144–45. 
 275 Id. at 145; see supra note 22. 
 276 Deane, 142 F.3d at 146–47. 
 277 Id. at 147. 
 278 Id. at 147–48. 
 279 Id. at 148. 
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ADA accommodations.280  Although it did not answer the question, 
the court did address the arguments made by both parties.  The 
plaintiff had argued that the ADA’s plain language required employ-
ers to accommodate “regarded as” disabilities.281  The plaintiff also ar-
gued that the Supreme Court had already answered this issue in a 
pro-plaintiff manner in School Board of Nassau County v. Arline.282  Fi-
nally, the plaintiff argued that allowing employers to escape liability 
for failing to accommodate “regarded as” plaintiffs would undermine 
the ADA’s ability to eliminate discrimination in the workplace.283  
Specifically, the plaintiff argued that “the ‘regarded as’ prong of the 
disability definition is premised upon the reality that the perception 
of disability, socially constructed and reinforced, is difficult to de-
stroy, and in most cases, merely informing the employer of its mis-
perception will not be enough.”284 
After articulating the plaintiff’s arguments, the court addressed 
the defendant’s two counterarguments.285  First, the defendant argued 
that interpreting the ADA in the manner urged by the plaintiff would 
allow healthy employees to sue or threaten to sue employers in order 
to demand workplace changes.286  Second, the defendant argued that 
a plain reading of the ADA would create a windfall for legitimate “re-
garded as” plaintiffs, who would be entitled to accommodations even 
after the employers’ misconceptions about the employees’ conditions 
had been corrected.287  Although the Third Circuit “express[ed] no 
opinion on the accommodation issue,”288 it did note that the defen-
dant’s arguments had “considerable force,”289 suggesting that had it 
decided the issue, it would have found that “regarded as” individuals 
are not entitled to reasonable accommodation. 
Six years later, however, the Third Circuit decided that “re-
garded as” individuals are entitled to accommodations.290  Although 
 
 280 Id. at 148 n.12 (“[W]e need not reach the more difficult question addressed by 
the panel whether ‘regarded as’ disabled plaintiffs must be accommodated by their 
employers if they cannot perform the essential functions of their jobs.”). 
 281 Id. 
 282 Deane, 142 F.3d at 148 n.12 (citing Sch. Bd. of Nassau County v. Arline, 480 
U.S. 273, 288–89 (1987)). 
 283 Id. 
 284 Id. 
 285 Id. 
 286 Id. 
 287 Id. 
 288 Deane, 142 F.3d at 148 n.12. 
 289 Id. 
 290 Williams v. Phila. Hous. Auth. Police Dep’t, 380 F.3d 751, 775–76 (3d Cir. 
2004). 
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the Third Circuit had previously hinted in Deane that accommoda-
tions were probably not required for these individuals, the court 
came to the opposite conclusion when the issue presented itself in 
Williams v. Philadelphia Housing Authority Police Department.291  In Wil-
liams, the Third Circuit reversed the district court’s grant of summary 
judgment in favor of the employer, concluding that there were genu-
ine issues of fact with respect to whether the plaintiff was actually dis-
abled or regarded as disabled.292  Furthermore, the court confirmed 
that accommodations are required in “regarded as” cases.293 
In Williams, the plaintiff sued his former employer after it termi-
nated him for failure to request a medical leave of absence.294  The 
plaintiff, who had been diagnosed with psychological problems, had 
been placed on work restrictions after making some threatening 
statements.295  After undergoing mental health evaluations, request-
ing different positions within the department, and having those re-
quests denied, the plaintiff was terminated, and he then sued his for-
mer employer.296  The plaintiff filed a multi-count complaint, 
alleging, among other things, violations of the ADA and the state law 
equivalent.297  By the close of discovery, only the ADA and equivalent 
state law claims remained, and the district court granted summary 
judgment in favor of the employer.298 
After affirming the district court’s grant of summary judgment 
on the plaintiff’s ADA retaliation claim,299 the Third Circuit addressed 
the discrimination claim.300  The first issue the court addressed was 
whether the plaintiff satisfied the definition of disability under the 
ADA.301  With respect to this specific issue, the court first had to de-
cide whether the plaintiff could satisfy the “actual disability” prong of 
the ADA’s definition.302  Concluding that there was a genuine issue of 
fact with respect to whether the plaintiff was substantially limited in 
 
 291 Id. at 775. 
 292 Id. at 768. 
 293 Id. at 775–76. 
 294 Id. at 756–58. 
 295 Id. at 756. 
 296 Williams, 380 F.3d at 758. 
 297 Id. (state law equivalent is the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act, 43 PA. CONS. 
STAT. ANN. §§ 951–963) (West 1991 & Supp. 2005). 
 298 Id. 
 299 Id. at 761. 
 300 Id. at 761–76. 
 301 Id. at 762–68. 
 302 Williams, 380 F.3d at 762–66. 
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the ability to work, the court decided that summary judgment on that 
issue was inappropriate.303 
The court then focused its attention on whether there was an is-
sue of fact with respect to whether the defendant regarded the plain-
tiff as disabled.304  Believing that reasonable jurors could conclude 
that the defendant regarded the plaintiff as disabled, the court de-
cided that summary judgment was inappropriate.305 
Next, the court turned to the issue of whether a plaintiff who is 
“regarded as” having a disability is entitled to an accommodation.306  
Despite the Third Circuit’s previous concerns in Deane, the Williams 
court concluded that the ADA does require accommodations for 
those who fall within this prong of the definition of disability.307  After 
referencing the split of authority on this issue,308 the court decided 
that the “better reasoned”309 opinions came from those courts that re-
quire accommodations for “regarded as” plaintiffs. 
In support of this view, the court first referenced the plain lan-
guage of the ADA.310  After reviewing the ADA’s definitions of “dis-
crimination” and “disability,” the court determined that the statute’s 
plain language mandates that accommodations be provided to those 
regarded as disabled.311  Both Kaplan v. City of North Las Vegas312 and 
Weber v. Strippit, Inc.313 acknowledged that the plain language would 
yield a pro-plaintiff result, but concluded that applying the plain lan-
guage would yield a “bizarre result.”314  The Third Circuit in Williams 
did acknowledge that in some cases this interpretation of the ADA 
could yield a bizarre result, but concluded that such a possibility did 
not warrant an “across-the-board” refusal to apply the ADA’s plain 
language.315 
After looking to the ADA’s plain language, the court focused on 
the ADA’s legislative history.316  The court determined that the “re-
 
 303 Id. at 766. 
 304 Id. at 766–68. 
 305 Id. at 767. 
 306 Id. at 772. 
 307 Id. at 774–75. 
 308 Williams, 380 F.3d at 773. 
 309 Id. 
 310 Id. at 774. 
 311 Id. 
 312 323 F.3d 1226, 1232 (9th Cir. 2003). 
 313 186 F.3d 907, 916 (8th Cir. 1999). 
 314 Williams, 380 F.3d at 773–74. 
 315 Id. at 774. 
 316 Id. 
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garded as” prong was intended by Congress to cover employees who, 
although not actually disabled, felt the effects of being disabled as a 
result of the “myths, fears and stereotypes” of others.317  Thus, for the 
Williams court, the legislative history confirmed that Congress in-
tended to extend the protections of the ADA to “regarded as” indi-
viduals “because being perceived as disabled ‘may prove just as dis-
abling.’”318 
The Third Circuit then looked to the Supreme Court’s decision 
in Arline for guidance.319  Although the Arline decision is mentioned 
in the ADA’s legislative history, the Williams court also devoted a 
separate part of its analysis to this case.320  As was previously men-
tioned, the Arline Court remanded the case to determine whether the 
employer could have reasonably accommodated the plaintiff, who 
was not “actually” disabled.321  The plaintiff suffered from tuberculo-
sis, and the Court determined that the Rehabilitation Act obligated 
the employer to accommodate her disability.322  The Third Circuit 
reasoned that, because the ADA and Rehabilitation Act play the same 
role, and because “the ADA must be read ‘to grant at least as much 
protection as provided by . . . the Rehabilitation Act,’”323 “regarded as” 
plaintiffs are entitled to reasonable accommodation under the 
ADA.324 
Finally, the court addressed the windfall argument.325  This the-
ory posits that requiring accommodations in “regarded as” cases re-
sults in a windfall to employees who, although they do not suffer from 
a substantially limiting impairment, are treated as though they do.326  
According to employers, this interpretation of the ADA places these 
“regarded as” employees in a better position than those employees 
who might have had the same condition but were not regarded as 
having substantially limiting impairments, and that both groups 
should be treated similarly.327  Like the Eastern District of New York in 
 
 317 Id. (citing H.R. REP. NO. 101-485, pt. 3 (1990), as reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
445, 453). 
 318 Id. 
 319 Id. at 775. 
 320 Williams, 380 F.3d at 775. 
 321 Sch. Bd. of Nassau County v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 288–89 (1987). 
 322 Id. at 289 n.19. 
 323 Williams, 380 F.3d at 775 (quoting Bragdon v. Abbott, 534 U.S. 624, 632 
(1998)).  See also supra note 43 and accompanying text. 
 324 Williams, 380 F.3d at 775. 
 325 Id. at 775–76. 
 326 Id. 
 327 Id. 
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Jacques v. DiMarzio, Inc.,328 the Third Circuit rejected this argument, 
noting that individuals regarded as disabled are not situated similarly 
to those who are not regarded as disabled.  The court noted:  
The employee whose limitations are perceived accurately gets to 
work, while [the plaintiff whose limitations are not perceived cor-
rectly] is sent home unpaid.  This is precisely the type of discrimi-
nation the “regarded as” prong literally protects from, as con-
firmed by the Supreme Court’s decision in Arline and the 
legislative history of the ADA.329   
The court acknowledged that requiring accommodations could yield 
“bizarre results,” but it was unwilling to ignore the ADA’s language 
based on that possibility alone.330  Thus, the Third Circuit became 
one of the circuits that concluded that accommodations are required 
in “regarded as” cases.331 
D. The Fifth Circuit 
Although the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Cir-
cuit has never issued a detailed analysis of this particular issue, it is 
clear that this circuit does not require employers to accommodate 
individuals who are regarded as disabled.332 
The only Fifth Circuit opinion on this issue came in Newberry v. 
East Texas State University, where the court affirmed a jury verdict in 
favor of the defendant on the plaintiff’s ADA claims.333  The plaintiff, 
a tenured professor who was fired because of his performance and 
because of his inability to get along with his colleagues, appealed a 
jury verdict in favor of his former employer, arguing that the trial 
judge erred in not giving the requested “regarded as” jury instruc-
tion.334  In addressing the plaintiff’s “regarded as” claim, the court 
noted that the “regarded as” prong of the definition is concerned 
 
 328 200 F. Supp. 2d 151 (E.D.N.Y. 2002). 
 329 Williams, 380 F.3d at 775–76. 
 330 Id. at 774. 
 331 Not surprisingly, since the Williams decision, courts within the Third Circuit 
have been following the rule that accommodations are required for individuals re-
garded as disabled under the ADA.  See Taylor v. USF-Red Star Express, Inc., No. 03-
2216, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3600, at *11 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 8, 2005); see also Custer v. 
Penn State Geisinger Health Sys., No. 00-cv-1860, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 28953, at 
*15–19 (M.D. Pa. Dec. 27, 2004). 
 332 Newberry v. E. Tex. State Univ., 161 F.3d 276 (5th Cir. 1998). 
 333 Id. at 277.  Prior to this opinion, the United States District Court for the North-
ern District of Texas had already concluded that accommodations are not required 
for individuals regarded as being disabled.  Cannizzaro v. Neiman Marcus, Inc., 979 
F. Supp. 465, 475 (N.D. Tex. 1997). 
 334 Newberry, 161 F.3d at 277. 
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with categorization rather than with symptoms.335  However, the court 
then noted, without any detailed explanation, that “an employer 
need not provide reasonable accommodation to an employee who 
does not suffer from a substantially limiting impairment merely be-
cause the employer thinks the employee has such an impairment.”336  
Thus, although the Fifth Circuit has expressed its opinion on this is-
sue, it did so with no detailed explanation and in a case where this 
specific question was not the main focus.337 
Since Newberry, the United States District Courts within the Fifth 
Circuit have also concluded that accommodations are not required in 
cases involving individuals “regarded as” disabled.  For example, in 
Matlock v. City of Dallas,338 the district court granted summary judg-
ment against the hearing-impaired plaintiff on his failure to accom-
modate claim.339  Even though the court concluded that summary 
judgment was inappropriate with respect to whether the plaintiff was 
regarded as disabled, the court did conclude that the plaintiff’s ac-
commodation claim based on a “regarded as” disability was appropri-
ate for summary judgment.340  The court gave little of its own explana-
tion for such a decision, but rather relied on the Eighth Circuit’s 
opinion in Weber v. Strippit, Inc.341 and on the opinion in Cannizzaro v. 
Neiman Marcus, Inc.,342 in which the Northern District of Texas noted 
that the duty to accommodate “arises only when the individual is dis-
abled; no such duty arises when the individual merely is ‘regarded as’ 
being disabled as defined under the ADA.”343 
In another case from within the Fifth Circuit, Price v. City of Ter-
rell,344 a plaintiff who attempted to argue that she was entitled to an 
accommodation because she was regarded as having a disability was 
unable to convince the court that the ADA required an accommoda-
tion.  The plaintiff in Price suffered from depression and argued that 
her employer regarded her as being substantially limited in a major 
 
 335 Id. at 279. 
 336 Id. at 280. 
 337 Id. 
 338 No. 3:97-CV-2735-D, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17953 (N.D. Tex. Nov. 12, 1999). 
 339 Id. at *1. 
 340 Id. at *17. 
 341 186 F.3d 907 (8th Cir. 1999). 
 342 979 F. Supp. 465 (N.D. Tex. 1997). 
 343 Id. at 475 (citing Howard v. Widnall, EEOC Doc. No. 01931095, 1994 WL 
747979, at *5 (EEOC May 12, 1994); EEOC, ADA CASE STUDY TRAINING: TRAINER’S 
MANUAL, CASE STUDY 1, at 6 (1996)). 
 344 No. 3 99-CV-0269-D, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18588 (N.D. Tex. Dec. 20, 2000). 
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life activity.345  After the court first rejected her actual disability claim, 
it went on to address her “regarded as” claim.346  The court first de-
termined that there was no genuine issue of material fact as to 
whether the plaintiff’s employer regarded her as disabled, and that 
summary judgment was appropriate on that basis.347  The court then 
bolstered its decision by noting that even if there was a question of 
fact regarding this issue, “regarded as” plaintiffs are not entitled to 
accommodations.348  The court gave no independent analysis of the 
issue, but rather relied on Weber and on Cannizzaro.349 
Thus, it is clear that “regarded as” plaintiffs are not entitled to 
accommodations within the Fifth Circuit.  This is also the case with 
the circuit discussed next, the Sixth Circuit. 
E. The Sixth Circuit 
The Sixth Circuit has also determined that accommodations are 
not required for individuals regarded as disabled.350  Although the 
court never specifically addressed the issue with a detailed analysis, it 
has made clear, by relying on the EEOC’s position, that it believes 
“regarded as” plaintiffs are not entitled to accommodations.351 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit ad-
dressed this issue in Workman v. Frito-Lay, Inc.,352 in which the plaintiff 
brought several ADA and parallel state law claims after she was termi-
nated by her employer.353  She alleged that she was terminated as a re-
sult of her disability and that she was retaliated against for filing a 
charge with the EEOC.354  After a jury decided in favor of the plaintiff 
with respect to the issue of liability, the case was appealed to the Sixth 
Circuit.355  After first addressing the jury instructions, the court went 
 
 345 Id. at *5–6, *10. 
 346 Id. at *11–13. 
 347 Id. at *15. 
 348 Id. at *15–16. 
 349 Id.; see also Reeves v. City of Dallas, No. 3:00-CV-1406-D, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
19285, at *12 (N.D. Tex. Nov. 21, 2001) (following Cannizzaro and concluding that 
plaintiffs who are regarded as having disabilities are not entitled to reasonable ac-
commodations under the ADA). 
 350 Workman v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 165 F.3d 460, 467 (6th Cir. 1999). 
 351 Id. 
 352 Id. at 460. 
 353 Id. at 464. 
 354 Id. 
 355 Id. at 464–65. 
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on to address the jury’s verdict, which involved an analysis of whether 
a plaintiff regarded as disabled is entitled to an accommodation.356 
This issue arose in the context of whether the jury was correct in 
determining that the plaintiff had a disability, and the court con-
cluded that the jury could have concluded that she had an actual dis-
ability as a result of her irritable bowel syndrome.357  The court then 
addressed whether the jury could have concluded that the plaintiff 
was regarded as disabled.358  The court concluded that the jury could 
have reached that conclusion, but the court also noted that under 
this prong of the “disability” definition, “the defendant correctly con-
tend[ed] that a finding on this basis would obviate the [c]ompany’s 
obligation to reasonably accommodate [the plaintiff].”359  The court 
relied on the EEOC Training Manual and on 29 C.F.R. § 
1630.2(l)(1)–(3) for this proposition.360 
Thus, although the specific issue of whether “regarded as” plain-
tiffs are entitled to accommodations under the ADA was not the spe-
cific issue addressed by the Sixth Circuit in Workman, the court used 
the opportunity to express its view that such accommodations are not 
necessary.361  Since this decision, courts have interpreted Workman as 
standing for the proposition that accommodations are not required 
in these “regarded as” cases.362 
F. The Seventh Circuit 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit is 
another court that has not decided this particular issue.  On at least 
two occasions, the court has had the opportunity to answer the issue, 
but it has specifically declined to do so.363  As a result of the Seventh 
Circuit’s failure to answer this question, the district courts within the 
Seventh Circuit have come to different conclusions. 
 
 356 Workman, 165 F.3d at 467. 
 357 Id. 
 358 Id. 
 359 Id. 
 360 Id. (citing EEOC Training Manual; 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(l)(1)–(3) (2005)); see 
supra note 5 for these regulations. 
 361 Id. 
 362 D’Angelo v. ConAgra Foods, Inc., 422 F.3d 1220, 1235 (11th Cir. 2005); Kelly v. 
Metallics W., Inc., 410 F.3d 670, 675 (10th Cir. 2005); Williams v. Phila. Hous. Auth. 
Police Dep’t, 380 F.3d 751, 773 (3d Cir. 2004). 
 363 See, e.g., Cigan v. Chippewa Falls Sch. Dist., 388 F.3d 331 (7th Cir. 2004); Mack 
v. Great Dane Trailers, 308 F.3d 776 (7th Cir. 2002). 
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The most recent opportunity the Seventh Circuit had to resolve 
this issue was in Cigan v. Chippewa Falls School District.364  In this case, 
the plaintiff sued her employer, claiming constructive discharge and 
an ADA violation.365  Specifically, the plaintiff alleged that the school 
failed to accommodate her several ailments and forced her into re-
tirement; the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the 
employer, and the Seventh Circuit affirmed.366  After first rejecting 
the plaintiff’s constructive discharge claim, the court addressed the 
issues surrounding her “regarded as” claim.367  The plaintiff argued 
that because her former employer made some efforts to accommo-
date her, that proved that it regarded her as disabled.368  The Seventh 
Circuit rejected this argument and determined that the employer did 
not regard the plaintiff as disabled.369  The court then addressed the 
issue discussed in this Article, but stopped short of answering it: “Be-
cause the record would not permit a reasonable trier of fact to con-
clude that the school district regarded [the plaintiff] as ‘disabled,’ we 
need not decide whether the ADA requires an employer to accom-
modate the demands of a person who is regarded as disabled but 
lacks an actual disability.”370  The court then noted the conflict among 
several of the circuits on this issue.371  The court next observed: 
Being regarded as disabled is a form of disability under the statute 
and thus could in principle trigger a duty to accommodate, but 
what must be accommodated: any condition that the employer 
(wrongly) supposes to exist, or only those disabilities that actually 
afflict the employee?  Suppose an employer wrongly believed that 
anyone who needs glasses is disabled under the ADA.  Near-
sighted employees at that firm might be “regarded as disabled,” 
but it is hard to imagine that, despite Sutton . . . the employer 
would have to afford them the sort of accommodations appropri-
ate to a genuine disability.  The extent to which employers’ errors 
in appreciating the extent of their workers’ real disabilities create 
obligations to accommodate can be left for another day, however, 
when the answer could make a difference.372 
 
 364 388 F.3d 331 (7th Cir. 2004). 
 365 Id. at 332. 
 366 Id. at 332, 336. 
 367 Id. at 332–34. 
 368 Id. 
 369 Id. at 335. 
 370 Cigan, 388 F.3d at 335. 
 371 Id. 
 372 Id. at 335–36 (citing Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471 (1999) 
(holding that correctable eye problems are not actually disabling)). 
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One of the problems with the lack of a definitive response from 
the Seventh Circuit is that courts within that jurisdiction have 
reached opposite conclusions with respect to this issue.  Although 
most courts within the Seventh Circuit believe that such accommoda-
tions are not required, at least one court has determined that they 
are. 
The Southern District of Indiana, in Miller v. Heritage Products, 
Inc.,373 was confronted with this issue, and it decided to follow the rea-
soning of the First Circuit in Katz v. City Metal Co.374 and the Eastern 
District of New York in Jacques v. DiMarzio, Inc.375  In Miller, the plain-
tiff first convinced the court that there was a genuine issue of mate-
rial fact with respect to whether his employer regarded him as dis-
abled, and then the court addressed whether that fact, if true, would 
require the employer to provide an accommodation.376  The defen-
dant argued that the ADA does not require an accommodation for an 
individual who is not actually disabled.377  The defendant relied on 
opinions from the Eighth and Ninth Circuits,378 but as previously 
noted, the court decided to follow the reasoning from the First Cir-
cuit and from the Eastern District of New York.379  Specifically, the 
court found the Katz and Jacques opinions “more persuasive” than the 
opinions in Weber v. Strippit, Inc.380 and Kaplan v. City of North Las Ve-
gas,381 and therefore agreed that accommodations are required in 
“regarded as” cases.382 
Several other courts within the Seventh Circuit have reached the 
opposite conclusion.383  One of these opinions comes from the 
Northern District of Illinois in Ammons-Lewis v. Metropolitan Water Rec-
 
 373 No. 1:02-cv-1345-DFH, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8531 (S.D. Ind. Apr. 21, 2004). 
 374 87 F.3d 26, 33 (1st Cir. 1996). 
 375 200 F. Supp. 2d 151, 163 (E.D.N.Y. 2002). 
 376 Miller, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8531, at *26–27. 
 377 Id. at *27–28. 
 378 Specifically, the defendant relied on Weber v. Strippit, Inc., 186 F.3d 907, 916–17 
(8th Cir. 1999), and on Kaplan v. City of North Las Vegas, 323 F.3d 1226, 1232 (9th Cir. 
2003). 
 379 Miller, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8531, at *26–28 (relying on Katz, 87 F.3d at 33; 
Jacques, 200 F. Supp. 2d at 163). 
 380 186 F.3d 907 (8th Cir. 1999). 
 381 323 F.3d 1226 (9th Cir. 2003). 
 382 Miller, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8531, at *26–28. 
 383 See Cebertowicz v. Motorola, Inc., 178 F. Supp. 2d 949, 953 (N.D. Ill. 2001), and 
Ross v. Matthews Employment, No. 00 C 1420, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16554, at *13 
(N.D. Ill. Oct. 24, 2000), for the proposition that accommodations are not required 
for individuals regarded as disabled. 
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lamation District.384  The plaintiff in Ammons-Lewis brought a multi-
count complaint, which included a failure to accommodate claim.385  
After holding that a jury could have concluded that the plaintiff’s 
employer did regard her as disabled, the court addressed whether 
such a finding would require an employer to accommodate a “re-
garded as” disability.386  The court acknowledged that the Seventh 
Circuit had not yet answered this question, and the employer, relying 
on opinions from the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits, and 
from district court opinions from within the Seventh Circuit, argued 
that no such duty exists.387  The court noted that all of these opinions 
rested on the belief that an impaired but non-disabled person who is 
regarded as disabled by his employer should not be treated more fa-
vorably than another impaired person who is not regarded as dis-
abled.388  The court then quoted the Eighth Circuit’s opinion in We-
ber, which noted that such unequal treatment of similarly-situated 
individuals is not possibly what the ADA was meant to encourage.389 
The court in Ammons-Lewis acknowledged the authority holding 
that accommodations are required in these cases,390 and recognized 
the concerns behind those cases: that employers’ attitudes can limit 
employees just as much as actual impairments, and that the ADA 
should protect employees against these misperceptions.391  However, 
in concluding that no accommodation was required, the court distin-
guished the facts before it from the facts in the cases requiring ac-
commodations and reasoned that it would “make no sense to impose 
a legally enforceable requirement for [the defendant] to accommo-
date [the plaintiff’s] non-existent ADA disability.”392 
Thus, without a clear statement on this issue from the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, district courts within 
that jurisdiction will continue to reach conflicting results.  This is not, 
however, the case within the Eighth Circuit, where it is crystal clear 
that accommodations are not required in cases involving individuals 
regarded as disabled. 
 
 384 No. 03 C 0885, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21917 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 1, 2004). 
 385 Id. at *1–2. 
 386 Id. at *13–14. 
 387 Id. at *13–16. 
 388 Id. at *14–15. 
 389 Id. (quoting Weber v. Strippit, Inc., 186 F.3d 907, 916–17 (8th Cir. 1999)). 
 390 Ammons-Lewis, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21917, at *15. 
 391 Id. at *15–16. 
 392 Id. at *16. 
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G. The Eighth Circuit 
The Eighth Circuit has definitively concluded that individuals 
who are regarded as disabled are not entitled to accommodations 
under the ADA.393  In fact, Weber v. Strippit, Inc. is one of the most of-
ten-cited cases for this proposition, and it has formed the basis for 
several other courts’ decisions not to allow accommodations in these 
cases. 
As was indicated earlier, the Eighth Circuit was the first to 
squarely address this issue.394  In Weber, the plaintiff brought suit under 
the ADA, the ADEA, and state law.395  The essence of the plaintiff’s 
ADA claim was that his former employer terminated him as a result of 
his heart disease, which had limited his ability to work.396  After he in-
dicated that he was unable to accept an intra-company transfer as a 
result of his work limitations, the plaintiff was terminated.397  After the 
plaintiff presented his case at trial, the court granted the defendant’s 
motion for judgment as a matter of law on the plaintiff’s “actual dis-
ability” claim.398  With respect to his remaining claims of age discrimi-
nation and discrimination based on a “regarded as” disability, the jury 
returned a defense verdict.399 
On appeal, the plaintiff raised several issues in addition to the 
question of whether individuals regarded as having disabilities are en-
titled to accommodations.  After briefly addressing those other issues, 
the Eighth Circuit finally addressed the issue of whether individuals 
regarded as having disabilities are entitled to accommodations under 
the ADA.  The court began by acknowledging that the district court 
had ruled that the ADA does not require employers to accommodate 
individuals regarded as having disabilities.400  The court then went on 
to identify the three elements an ADA plaintiff must establish to pre-
vail on such a claim.401  Of central importance to this Article is the 
second element of that prima facie case—that the plaintiff was a 
“qualified individual.”  The court started its analysis of this issue by 
reciting the ADA’s definition of that term and acknowledging that 
this determination involves a two-prong test, asking: (1) whether the 
 
 393 Weber, 186 F.3d at 917. 
 394 Id. at 916–17. 
 395 Id. at 910. 
 396 Id. 
 397 Id. 
 398 Id. 
 399 Weber, 186 F.3d at 910. 
 400 Id. at 915–16. 
 401 Id. at 916. 
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individual has the requisite skill, experience, and education required 
of the position, and (2) whether the individual can perform the es-
sential functions of the position either with or without a reasonable 
accommodation.402 
The Eighth Circuit first addressed the issue of accommoda-
tions.403  The court noted that this is an easier issue to conceptualize 
in cases involving actual disabilities.404  The court noted that provid-
ing accommodations in actual disability cases was “perfectly consis-
tent with the ADA’s goal of protecting individuals with disabling im-
pairments who nonetheless can, with reasonable efforts on the part of 
their employers, perform the essential functions of their jobs.”405 
The Eighth Circuit then opined that the reasonable accommo-
dation requirement “makes considerably less sense in the perceived 
disability context.”406  Believing that a reading of the plain language of 
the ADA would require employers to accommodate these individuals, 
the Eighth Circuit reasoned that such a reading of the statute would 
yield “bizarre results,” and thus the court was free to ignore the stat-
ute’s plain language.407  The court gave the following explanation why 
such a strict following of the ADA would lead to “bizarre results”: 
Assume, for instance, that [the plaintiff’s] heart condition pre-
vented him from relocating to Akron but did not substantially 
limit any major life activity.  Absent a perceived disability, defen-
dants could terminate [him] without exposing themselves to li-
ability under the ADA.  If the hypothetical is altered, however, 
such that defendants mistakenly perceive [the plaintiff’s] heart 
condition as substantially limiting one or more major life activi-
ties, defendants would be required to reasonably accommodate 
[the plaintiff’s] condition by, for instance, delaying his relocation 
to Akron.  Although [the plaintiff’s] impairment is no more se-
vere in this example than in the first, [the plaintiff] would now be 
entitled to accommodations for a non-disabling impairment that 
no similarly situated employees would enjoy.408 
The court acknowledged the split in authority on this issue, cit-
ing Katz v. City Metal Co. from the First Circuit and Deane v. Pocono 
 
 402 Id. 
 403 Id. 
 404 Id. 
 405 Weber, 186 F.3d at 910. 
 406 Id. 
 407 Id.; see Royal Foods Co., v. RJR Holdings, Inc., 252 F.3d 1102, 1108 (9th Cir. 
2001) (noting that courts must look beyond the plain language of a statute if follow-
ing the plain language would yield an absurd result). 
 408 Weber, 186 F.3d at 916. 
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Medical Center from the Third Circuit.409  After setting forth the ra-
tionales of the First and Third Circuits, the Eighth Circuit concluded 
that the Deane court’s suggestion that accommodations are not re-
quired for perceived disabilities was more sound.410  The court ac-
knowledged the concerns regarding healthy employees potentially 
forcing employers to provide changes in the workplace “under the 
guise of ‘reasonable accommodations’” and the possibility that such 
an interpretation of the ADA would provide a “windfall for legitimate 
‘regarded as’ disabled employees” who would be entitled to accom-
modations not available to similarly situated employees.411  After ac-
knowledging these concerns, which were raised by the court in Deane, 
the court concluded that the ADA could not “reasonably have been 
intended to create a disparity in treatment among impaired but non-
disabled employees, denying most the right to reasonable accommo-
dations but granting to others, because of their employers’ misper-
ceptions, a right to reasonable accommodations no more limited 
than those afforded actually disabled employees.”412  The Eighth Cir-
cuit then held that “regarded as” individuals were not entitled to ac-
commodations,413 and in doing so, became the first United States 
Court of Appeals to make that determination when directly con-
fronted with the issue.414 
H. The Ninth Circuit 
Although usually an employee-friendly court, the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has also concluded that indi-
viduals “regarded as” disabled are not entitled to accommodations.415  
Four years after the Eighth Circuit’s opinion in Weber v. Strippit, Inc., 
the Ninth Circuit was faced with the issue of reasonable accommoda-
tions for individuals “regarded as” having disabilities and agreed with 
 
 409 Id. at 916–17. 
 410 See id. at 917. 
 411 Id. 
 412 Id. 
 413 Id. 
 414 Not surprisingly, since the Eighth Circuit’s opinion in Weber, the district courts 
within that circuit have concluded that accommodations are not required for indi-
viduals regarded as disabled.  See Bishop v. Nu-Way Service States, Inc., 340 F. Supp. 
2d 1008, 1014 (E.D. Mo. 2004); Nichols v. ABB DE, Inc., 324 F. Supp. 2d 1036, 1044–
45 (E.D. Mo. 2004); Habib-Stevens v. Trans States Airlines, Inc., 229 F. Supp. 2d 945, 
947 (E.D. Mo. 2002). 
 415 Kaplan v. City of N. Las Vegas, 323 F.3d 1226, 1231–33 (9th Cir. 2003). 
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the Eighth Circuit’s conclusion that no accommodations are required 
in these cases.416 
The plaintiff in Kaplan v. City of North Las Vegas worked as a dep-
uty marshal, a job which required him to use his hands while engag-
ing in several physical activities on the job, including use of firearms 
and engaging in combative situations with inmates.417  During a train-
ing exercise, the plaintiff injured his wrist and thumb and was unable 
to perform several of these physical tasks.418  The plaintiff received a 
light duty assignment for a period, but he was eventually terminated 
when his employer determined that he would not be able to perform 
his job functions.419  As a result, the plaintiff filed suit under the 
ADA.420  After concluding that the plaintiff did not suffer from a dis-
ability, the district court granted summary judgment in favor of the 
defendant.421  However, the Ninth Circuit concluded that the plaintiff 
had raised a genuine issue of material fact with respect to whether 
the defendant regarded him as having a disability.422  On remand, the 
district court once again granted summary judgment, concluding that 
the plaintiff was not a “qualified individual with a disability.”423  The 
plaintiff appealed again, and this time the Ninth Circuit addressed 
the accommodation issue. 
The Ninth Circuit first addressed whether the plaintiff could 
have performed the essential functions of his position without an ac-
 
 416 Id.  Prior to the Ninth Circuit’s opinion in Kaplan, at least two district courts 
within the Ninth Circuit concluded that the ADA does not require accommodations 
for individuals regarded as having a disability.  As was discussed earlier, in Fontanilla 
v. City and County of San Francisco, No. C-96-3916 JCS, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6919 
(N.D. Cal. Feb. 28, 2001), the United States District Court for the Northern District 
of California reasoned that because the ADA’s text was ambiguous with respect to 
this issue, a review of both the EEOC regulations and guidelines, and the ADA’s leg-
islative history, was appropriate.  Id. at *48–49.  After analyzing those tools of statu-
tory interpretation, the court concluded that accommodations were not required.  
Id. at *50–53.  Although the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit 
reached the same ultimate conclusion that accommodations are not required in 
these cases, as will be discussed in this section, it reached that conclusion based on 
different reasoning.  Also prior to the Ninth Circuit’s opinion in Kaplan was Deppe v. 
United Airlines, No. C 96-3916 JCS, 2001 U.S. Dist LEXIS 11569, at *13–16 (N.D. Cal. 
July 29, 2001), where the court decided to follow the several circuits that had previ-
ously decided that accommodations are not required in cases involving individuals 
who are regarded as disabled. 
 417 Kaplan, 323 F.3d at 1227–28. 
 418 Id. at 1228. 
 419 Id. at 1228–29. 
 420 See id. at 1229. 
 421 Id. 
 422 Id. at 1231. 
 423 Kaplan, 323 F.3d at 1231. 
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commodation.424  Agreeing with the district court, the Ninth Circuit 
concluded that the plaintiff did not satisfy his burden of showing that 
he could have performed those essential functions.425  The court then 
addressed whether the plaintiff was entitled to an accommodation.426  
In addressing this issue, the court acknowledged that different courts 
had reached conflicting conclusions on this point.427  The court also 
acknowledged that at the time of the opinion, the weight of authority 
favored the employer’s position that accommodations were not re-
quired in “regarded as” cases.428  After making these preliminary ob-
servations, the court started its own analysis. 
The court began with the ADA’s plain language.429  After first ac-
knowledging that the plain language would result in an employer 
having to accommodate a “regarded as” disability, the court then de-
cided to ignore the ADA’s plain language.  Relying extensively on We-
ber v. Strippit, Inc.,430 the Ninth Circuit agreed with the Eighth Circuit 
that requiring employers to accommodate “regarded as” disabilities 
was not what Congress intended and would result in bizarre out-
comes.431 
The court relied heavily on policy reasons and upon “what if” 
justifications for its decision; specifically, the court determined that 
requiring employers to provide accommodations for individuals re-
garded as having disabilities would: (a) encourage employees to allow 
their employers to treat them as disabled even if they were not, which 
would be a “perverse and troubling result under a statute aimed at 
decreasing ‘stereotypic assumptions not truly indicative of the indi-
vidual ability’” of these individuals; (b) discourage individuals re-
garded as having disabilities from informing and educating their em-
ployers of their actual capabilities and thus discourage employers 
from seeing these employees’ abilities; (c) force employers to spend 
 
 424 Id. at 1230–31. 
 425 Id. at 1231. 
 426 Id. 
 427 Id. 
 428 Id. 
 429 Kaplan, 323 F.3d at 1231–32.  The court relied on the following proposition for 
beginning its analysis with the statute’s language: “‘It is elementary that the meaning 
of a statute must, in the first instance, be sought in the language in which the act is 
framed, and if that is plain, . . . the sole function of the courts is to enforce it accord-
ing to its terms.’”  Id. (quoting Carson Harbor Vil., Ltd. v. Unocal Corp., 270 F.3d 
863, 878 (9th Cir. 2001) (quoting Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 485 
(1917))) (alteration in original).  Despite citing this “elementary” principle, as will 
be seen shortly, the court decided to ignore the statute’s plain language.  Id. at 1232. 
 430 186 F.3d 907 (8th Cir. 1999). 
 431 Kaplan, 323 F.3d at 1232–33 (citing Weber, 186 F.3d at 917). 
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money unnecessarily rather than use that money to provide accom-
modations to those individuals who actually needed them; and (d) 
provide a windfall for “regarded as” individuals.432 
After giving these justifications for holding that accommodations 
are not required for “regarded as” individuals, the court acknowl-
edged that this was not an “easy question” in light of the ADA’s plain 
language; but it did, nonetheless, agree with the Eighth Circuit’s po-
sition in Weber.433  Thus, the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Ninth Circuit became another court to reject the argument that the 
ADA required accommodations for “regarded as” plaintiffs. 
I. The Tenth Circuit 
One of the most recent decisions on this particular issue from a 
United States Court of Appeals came from the Tenth Circuit in Kelly 
v. Metallics West, Inc.434  In Kelly, the Tenth Circuit became the third 
circuit court to determine that accommodations are required in cases 
involving individuals who are “regarded as” disabled.435  And, since 
the Kelly and Williams v. Philadelphia Housing Authority Police Department 
decisions, the Eleventh Circuit has also joined the trend of requiring 
accommodations for individuals regarded as disabled.436 
 
 432 Id. at 1232 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(7)).  The court relied on the Third 
Circuit’s dicta in Taylor v. Pathmark Stores Inc., 177 F.3d 180, 196 (3d Cir. 1999), for 
the windfall argument.  Kaplan, 323 F.3d at 1232. 
 433 Kaplan, 323 F.3d at 1232–33.  Since the Ninth Circuit’s opinion in Kaplan, sev-
eral district courts within the Ninth Circuit have concluded that accommodations are 
not required in cases involving individuals who are regarded as disabled.  Whitehall 
v. City of Santa Rosa, No. C 03-3186 SBA, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21453, at *9 (N.D. 
Cal. Oct. 19, 2004); Bass v. County of Butte, No. CIV-S-02-2443 DFL/GGH, 2004 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 17191, at *16 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 4, 2004). 
 434 410 F.3d 670 (10th Cir. 2005).  Prior to this opinion, a district court within the 
Tenth Circuit had addressed this issue.  Specifically, in Powers v. Tweco Products, Inc., 
206 F. Supp. 2d 1097, 1114 (D. Kan. 2002), the district court expressed its view that 
such accommodations are not required in cases involving individuals who are merely 
regarded as disabled. 
 435 See Kelly, 410 F.3d at 676; see also Williams v. Phila. Hous. Auth. Police Dep’t, 
380 F.3d 751, 776 (3d Cir. 2004); Katz v. City Metal Co., 87 F.3d 26, 33 (1st Cir. 
1996). 
 436 See D’Angelo v. ConAgra Foods, Inc., 422 F.3d 1220, 1235 (11th Cir. 2005); see 
also Kelly, 410 F.3d at 676; Williams, 380 F.3d at 776. 
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In Kelly,437 the plaintiff sued her former employer after it refused 
to allow her to bring oxygen to work and eventually terminated her 
employment.438  The plaintiff brought a multi-count complaint, alleg-
ing ADA violations.439  After a jury ruled in favor of the plaintiff, the 
employer appealed, raising the issue of whether an accommodation is 
required for individuals “regarded as” disabled.440  After acknowledg-
ing the split of authority, the Tenth Circuit agreed with the First and 
Third Circuits and concluded that accommodations are required in 
cases involving individuals “regarded as” disabled.441  The court con-
cluded that “the plain language of the ADA’s interlocking statutory 
definitions includes within the rubric of a ‘qualified individual with a 
disability’ protected by the ADA individuals (1) regarded as disabled, 
but (2) who, with reasonable accommodation, can perform the essen-
tial functions of the position that they hold.”442  The court then con-
cluded that the plaintiff fit within that category of individuals.443 
The court rejected the “bizarre results” reasoning of the Eighth 
and Ninth Circuits.444  Reasoning that those courts’ rationales “pro-
vide[d] no basis for denying validity to a reasonable accommodation 
claim,”445 and highlighting its “fail[ure] to understand” the Weber and 
Kaplan concerns,446 the Tenth Circuit rejected the argument that al-
lowing accommodations would “‘do nothing to encourage . . . em-
ployees to educate employers of their capabilities’ or to ‘encourage 
the employers to see their employees’ talents clearly.’”447  The Tenth 
Circuit agreed with the Third Circuit in Williams about the real con-
cern: that allowing stereotypic assumptions in “regarded as” cases 
 
 437 Prior to the Kelly opinion, the Tenth Circuit had tangentially discussed this is-
sue in McKenzie v. Dovala, 242 F.3d 967, 975–76 (10th Cir. 2001), in which the court 
addressed whether a plaintiff who was regarded as disabled made out a prima facie 
case under the ADA based on her employer’s failure to accommodate her.  The de-
fendant in Kelly argued that McKenzie did not directly address this specific issue, and 
relied on Kaplan, 323 F.3d at 1231–32, Weber v. Strippit, Inc., 186 F.3d 907, 916–17 
(8th Cir. 1999), Workman v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 165 F.3d 460, 467 (6th Cir. 1999), and 
Newberry v. East Texas State University, 161 F.3d 276, 280 (5th Cir. 1998), for the propo-
sition that such accommodations were not required.  Kelly, 410 F.3d at 675. 
 438 Kelly, 410 F.3d at 672–73. 
 439 Id. at 673. 
 440 Id. at 674. 
 441 Id. at 675–76. 
 442 Id. at 675. 
 443 Id. 
 444 Kelly, 410 F.3d at 675–76. 
 445 See id. at 676. 
 446 Id. 
 447 Id. (quoting Kaplan v. City of N. Las Vegas, 323 F.3d 1226, 1232 (9th Cir. 
2003)) (alteration in original). 
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would essentially force an employee whose limitations are incorrectly 
perceived to be “sent home unpaid.”448  The court concluded: 
 That is to say, an employer who is unable or unwilling to shed 
his or her stereotypic assumptions based on a faulty or prejudiced 
perception of an employee’s abilities must be prepared to ac-
commodate the artificial limitations created by his or her own 
faulty perceptions.  In this sense, the ADA encourages employers 
to become more enlightened about their employees’ capabilities, 
while protecting employees from employers whose attitudes re-
main mired in prejudice. 
 An additional concern arises regarding the use of the phrase 
“reasonable accommodation.”  Can it be inherently “unreason-
able” to accommodate an employee who is only regarded as dis-
abled?  Congress does not appear to have thought so, for its defi-
nition of “reasonable accommodation” makes no distinction 
between employees who are actually disabled and those who are 
merely regarded as disabled.449 
The Tenth Circuit therefore joined the First and Third Circuits 
in concluding that accommodations are available to individuals re-
garded as disabled under the ADA. 
J. The Eleventh Circuit 
The most recent United States Court of Appeals to address this 
issue is the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit.  
Although this court has traditionally been pro-employer in its em-
ployment-related decisions, it decided to join the current trend of 
finding that accommodations are required for individuals who are 
regarded as disabled when it decided D’Angelo v. ConAgra Foods, Inc.450  
Prior to D’Angelo, the Eleventh Circuit had hinted that such accom-
modations were required, but never affirmatively made that point.451 
 
 448 Id. 
 449 Id. 
 450 422 F.3d 1220 (11th Cir. 2005). 
 451 For example, in an earlier, non-employment case involving a provision of the 
Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 706, 794 (2002), the Eleventh Circuit sug-
gested that perhaps individuals who are regarded as disabled are entitled to accom-
modations.  Harris v. Thigpen, 941 F.2d 1495, 1525–27 (11th  Cir. 1991) (comment-
ing that HIV-positive prisoners who were regarded as being “handicapped” under the 
Rehabilitation Act might be entitled to reasonable accommodations).  After Harris, 
in a Rehabilitation Act case from a district court within the Eleventh Circuit, Mitchell 
v. Crowell, 966 F. Supp. 1071, 1080 n.9 (N.D. Ala. 1996), the court specifically de-
clined to answer the question of whether these individuals are entitled to accommo-
dations, despite acknowledging that in Harris, the Eleventh Circuit suggested that 
accommodations are required.  More recently, the Eleventh Circuit hinted that ac-
commodations are required in cases involving individuals regarded as disabled.  
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In D’Angelo, the plaintiff sued her former employer under the 
ADA and under the analogous state law after the employer fired her 
as a result of her vertigo.452  The plaintiff alleged that she was both ac-
tually disabled and regarded as disabled, but the trial court granted 
the defendant’s motion for summary judgment on both claims.453  
The district court determined that the plaintiff did not suffer from an 
actual disability because her impairment did not substantially limit 
her ability to work, and that even though there was a genuine issue of 
material fact with respect to whether her former employer regarded 
her as disabled, the ADA did not require accommodations for indi-
viduals regarded as disabled.454  The district court determined that 
even if the ADA did require such accommodations, the plaintiff 
could not have performed the essential functions of her job with such 
an accommodation.455 
After first agreeing with the district court on the plaintiff’s actual 
disability claim, the Eleventh Circuit addressed the plaintiff’s “re-
garded as” claim.456  Agreeing that there was a genuine issue of fact 
with respect to whether the plaintiff was regarded as disabled, the 
court then determined that there was a genuine issue of material fact 
with respect to whether certain aspects of the plaintiff’s job were “es-
sential functions.”457  After addressing those two preliminary issues, 
the court addressed the issue that is the focus of this Article.458 
The Eleventh Circuit first acknowledged that the lower court be-
lieved accommodations were not required in “regarded as” cases,459 
and it then identified the split of authority on the issue.460  Although 
 
Roberts v. Rayonier, Inc., 135 F. App’x 351, 357 (11th Cir. 2005) (noting that as part 
of an ADA retaliation claim, plaintiff must establish that “he had a reasonable belief 
that he was disabled or regarded as disabled and thus entitled to an accommoda-
tion”).  The Roberts opinion did not affirmatively state that “regarded as” plaintiffs 
are, in fact, entitled to accommodations but merely stated that a plaintiff can base an 
ADA retaliation claim on a belief that such an accommodation is required.  Id. (out-
lining the elements of a prima facie retaliation claim under the ADA). 
 452 D’Angelo, 422 F.3d at 1221–22. 
 453 Id. 
 454 Id. at 1224. 
 455 Id. 
 456 Id. at 1226–28. 
 457 Id. at 1229 n.5, 1234. 
 458 D’Angelo, 422 F.3d at 1235. 
 459 Id. at 1234. 
 460 Id. at 1235.  The Eleventh Circuit pointed out that the Third Circuit had con-
cluded that accommodations are required, while the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Ninth 
Circuits had concluded that accommodations were not required.  Id.  The court also 
noted that the First Circuit had tangentially addressed the issue and assumed that 
accommodations were required.  Id.  The Eleventh Circuit did not cite to the most 
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the court cited more authority for the proposition that accommoda-
tions are not required in these cases, it agreed with the Third Cir-
cuit’s analysis in Williams and concluded that accommodations are 
required.461  The court focused on the ADA’s plain language, the Su-
preme Court’s decision in School Board of Nassau County v. Arline,462 the 
ADA’s legislative history, and a rejection of the arguments in Weber v. 
Strippit, Inc. and Kaplan v. City of North Las Vegas.463 
The court began its analysis with the ADA’s plain language.464  
After reviewing the ADA’s definitions of “disability,” “qualified indi-
vidual with a disability,” and “discrimination,” along with the Act’s 
substantive prohibition against discrimination, the court concluded 
that “the statute’s prohibition on discrimination applies equally to all 
statutorily defined disabilities,”465 and that “[t]he text of this statute 
simply offers no basis for differentiating among the three types of 
disabilities in determining which are entitled to a reasonable accom-
modation and which are not.”466  The Eleventh Circuit also noted that 
the ADA’s plain language compelled the court to conclude that its 
terms require employers to provide accommodations for individuals 
they regard as disabled.467 
After addressing the plain language argument, the Eleventh Cir-
cuit noted that the conclusion it reached was consistent with both Ar-
line and the congressional intent behind the ADA.468  The court 
quoted Arline’s analysis regarding the purpose of recognizing “re-
garded as” disabilities,469 and noted its approval of the Third Circuit’s 
reasoning in Williams v. Philadelphia Housing Authority Police Depart-
ment470 that the Supreme Court’s decisions in Arline and Bragdon v. Ab-
bott471 compelled the conclusion that accommodations are required 
 
recent opinion on the issue, which was from the Tenth Circuit.  See Kelly v. Metallics 
W., Inc., 410 F.3d 670 (10th Cir. 2005). 
 461 D’Angelo, 422 F.3d at 1235 (agreeing with Williams v. Philadelphia Housing Au-
thority Police Department, 380 F.3d 751, 776 (3d Cir. 2004), that the ADA requires ac-
commodations in “regarded as” cases). 
 462 480 U.S. 273 (1987). 
 463 D’Angelo, 422 F.3d at 1235–39. 
 464 Id. at 1235. 
 465 Id. at 1235–36. 
 466 Id. at 1236.  See also supra notes 3, 4, 22 (providing the ADA’s definitions of 
“discrimination,” “disability,” and “qualified individual with a disability”). 
 467 D’Angelo, 422 F.3d at 1236. 
 468 Id. at 1236–38. 
 469 Id. at 1236–37 (quoting Sch. Bd. of Nassau County v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 284–
85 (1987)). 
 470 380 F.3d 751, 775 (3d Cir. 2004). 
 471 524 U.S. 624 (1998). 
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for individuals regarded as disabled.472  When the court next focused 
on the ADA’s legislative history, it noted that Congress provided at 
least as much protection in the ADA as it did in the Rehabilitation 
Act, and that because the Rehabilitation Act required accommoda-
tions in these circumstances, there was “no principled basis” to con-
clude that the ADA did not provide similar protections.473 
The court then attacked the reasoning used by the courts that 
had reached the opposite conclusion.474  After quoting the passage 
from Weber regarding the possible anomalous results that requiring 
accommodations might yield,475 the Eleventh Circuit noted that 
“‘courts are not authorized to rewrite a statute because they might 
deem its effects susceptible of improvement.’”476  Citing additional au-
thority regarding the courts’ role in a system based on a separation of 
powers, the court observed: 
 Thus, as a court, we are not free to question the efficacy of legis-
lation that Congress validly enacted.  Within constitutional limits, 
Congress may “improvidently” elect to legislate what the Ninth 
Circuit has characterized as a “windfall” for employees regarded 
as disabled, or may “compel employers to waste resources” that, in 
our sister Circuit’s judgment, “would be better spent assisting 
those persons who are actually disabled.”  We do not think that 
these judgements and the complex legislative calibrations that 
underlie them are for us to make.  Quite simply, we are without 
authority to pass judgment on the wisdom of a congressional en-
actment.477 
Continuing its assault on the Ninth and Eighth Circuits, the 
court also disagreed with the Ninth Circuit’s statement that “[t]he ab-
sence of a stated distinction [between the three alternative prongs of 
the ‘disability’ definition] . . . is not tantamount to an explicit instruc-
tion by Congress that ‘regarded as’ individuals are entitled to reason-
able accommodations.”478  The court noted that applying the plain 
language in this type of case was not “one of those rare cases” where 
 
 472 D’Angelo, 422 F.3d at 1236–37.  The D’Angelo court relied on Bragdon, 524 U.S. 
at 631–32, for the proposition that courts should interpret the ADA in a manner 
similar to the way courts interpret the Rehabilitation Act. 
 473 D’Angelo, 422 F.3d at 1236–37. 
 474 Id. at 1237–38. 
 475 Id. (quoting Weber v. Strippit, Inc., 186 F.3d 907, 917 (8th Cir. 1999)). 
 476 Id. (quoting In re Jove Eng’g, Inc., v. IRS, 92 F.3d 1539, 1552 (11th Cir. 1996)). 
 477 Id. at 1238 (quoting Kaplan v. City of N. Las Vegas, 323 F.3d 1226, 1232 (9th 
Cir. 2003)). 
 478 Id. (quoting Kaplan, 323 F.3d at 1232) (second and third alterations in origi-
nal). 
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applying a statute’s plain language would produce a result that was 
“demonstrably at odds” with Congress’s intent.479 
The D’Angelo court next took aim at the Eighth Circuit’s reason-
ing in Weber.480  First, it concluded that the Weber court was incorrect 
when it labeled “regarded as” employees as “impaired but non-
disabled” because, according to the ADA, people who were regarded 
as disabled were, in fact, disabled.481  Thus, the Eighth Circuit’s char-
acterization of these individuals as “non-disabled” was incorrect.482  
Next, the D’Angelo court borrowed the argument from Jacques v. Di-
Marzio, Inc.483 that an employee who is regarded as disabled by his 
employer is not similarly situated to an employee who is not regarded 
as disabled (even if both have the same medical condition), and thus 
it is an acceptable reading of the ADA to require accommodations for 
the person whom the employer regards as disabled while the individ-
ual who is not so regarded would not receive an accommodation.484  
Relying on the Third Circuit in Williams, the court then noted that 
“‘the employee whose limitations are perceived accurately gets to 
work, while [the plaintiff whose limitations are not perceived cor-
rectly] is sent home unpaid.’”485 
Therefore, based on the ADA’s plain language, the Supreme 
Court’s Arline decision, the ADA’s legislative history, and the rejection 
of the reasoning of the Eighth and Ninth Circuits, the Eleventh Cir-
cuit joined the First, Third, and Tenth Circuits in holding that ac-
commodations are required for individuals regarded as disabled.486  
As did the Third Circuit, the Eleventh Circuit noted that there might 
be some situations in which this rule could yield “bizarre results,” but 
that the possibility of such an outcome did not warrant an “across-the-
board refusal” to require accommodations in “regarded as” cases.487 
As this section of the Article has made clear, there is a split of au-
thority over whether individuals who are regarded as disabled are en-
titled to accommodations.  Although many courts still agree that ac-
 
 479 D’Angelo, 422 F.3d at 1238–39. 
 480 Id. at 1239. 
 481 Id. 
 482 Id. 
 483 200 F. Supp. 2d 151 (E.D.N.Y. 2002). 
 484 D’Angelo, 422 F.3d at 1239 (citing Jacques, 200 F. Supp. 2d at 170). 
 485 Id. (quoting Williams v. Phila. Hous. Auth. Police Dep’t, 380 F.3d 751, 775 (3d 
Cir. 2004)) (alteration in original). 
 486 Id.  As was mentioned earlier, the First Circuit also requires accommodations 
for individuals regarded as disabled, although that court never directly addressed that 
issue. 
 487 Id. 
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commodations are not required, the next section of this Article will 
argue that this position is incorrect, and that requiring accommoda-
tions in these cases is the better approach.  Alternatively, courts could 
use a case-by-case approach for deciding this issue, and not strictly 
adhere to a bright-line rule that either requires or denies accommo-
dations in “regarded as” cases. 
V. WHY “YES” IS A BETTER ANSWER, AND A POSSIBLE  
ALTERNATIVE TO A BRIGHT-LINE RULE 
There are several reasons why the courts that have concluded 
that individuals regarded as disabled are entitled to accommodations 
are correct.  This section of the Article will highlight the reasons why 
accommodations should be required in “regarded as” cases,488 and it 
will also suggest an alternative option.  That alternative option would 
use a multi-factor, case-by-case analysis, which occurs in several other 
areas involving the ADA.489  Regardless of whether the courts adopt a 
rule that requires accommodations in “regarded as” cases or a rule 
that uses a case-by-case approach, an across-the-board refusal to pro-
vide accommodations deprives many capable individuals of working, 
which is something Congress did not intend. 
A. Putting the Issue in Perspective 
Before addressing why courts should not deny accommodations 
to “regarded as” plaintiffs and suggesting a possible alternative, there 
are two issues courts and employers must keep in mind.  First, they 
must realize how difficult a burden it is for an employee to prove that 
she was regarded as disabled under the ADA.  Second, they must real-
ize that even if an employee is able to jump this hurdle and prove 
 
 488 Although several of these justifications will echo the ones mentioned in Sec-
tion II of this Article, not all of those justifications will be repeated.  Additionally, 
some of the justifications in this Section were not specifically mentioned in that Sec-
tion.  Finally, although I have not devoted a separate section of this Article to ad-
dressing each of the reasons courts have used when deciding that accommodations 
are not required in “regarded as” cases, the pro-employer arguments made in Section 
III of this Article will be addressed and dismissed throughout this Section of the Arti-
cle. 
 489 For example, the determination of whether an individual has a disability is 
made on a case-by-case basis.  Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 483 
(1999).  Also, whether an accommodation is reasonable is determined on a case-by-
case basis.  Kennedy v. Dresser Rand Co., 193 F.3d 120, 122 (2d Cir. 1999).  Also, 
prior to Sutton, one court used a case-by-case analysis to determine whether mitigat-
ing measures should be used in determining whether an individual suffers from a 
disability.  Washington v. HCA Health Servs. of Tex., Inc., 152 F.3d 464, 470–71 (5th 
Cir. 1998). 
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that she was regarded as disabled, she will only be entitled to a reason-
able accommodation, not to one that would cause any type of undue 
hardship.490  Thus, if courts decide to require employers to accom-
modate individuals regarded as disabled, this will not impact a tre-
mendous number of plaintiffs, as very few will be able to demonstrate 
that their employers regarded them as having a disability.  And, for 
the plaintiffs who are able to prove this, this will require employers to 
provide an accommodation only if it does not pose an undue hard-
ship.  Therefore, any concern that such a pro-plaintiff determination 
by the Supreme Court would be a fatal blow to employers is unwar-
ranted.  On the other hand, it will help individuals who, because of 
their employers’ misperceptions, are facing disadvantages in the 
workplace, which is something the ADA was meant to eliminate.491 
1. The High Burden of Proving a “Regarded As” Disability 
One very important consideration courts should keep in mind 
when addressing this issue is that a plaintiff has a very high burden to 
prove that she was regarded as having a disability.  First, according to 
the ADA’s definition of “disability,” the plaintiff must prove that her 
employer regarded her as having a physical or mental impairment 
that “substantially limited” her in a “major life activity.”492  According 
to the Code of Federal Regulations, “substantially limits” means ei-
ther “[u]nable to perform a major life activity that the average person 
in the general population can perform;” or “[s]ignificantly restricted 
as to the condition, manner or duration under which an individual 
can perform a particular major life activity as compared to the condi-
tion, manner or duration under which the average person in the 
general population can perform that same major life activity.”493  Also 
according the Code of Federal Regulations, “major life activities” in-
clude activities “such as caring for oneself, performing manual tasks, 
walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, and work-
ing.”494 
With the Supreme Court’s recent pronouncements on the 
ADA’s disability definition, a plaintiff faces an uphill battle when try-
ing to prove a disability under any prong of the ADA, including the 
 
 490 See supra note 3. 
 491 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(2) (2000). 
 492 Id. § 12102(2). 
 493 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j) (2005). 
 494 Id. § 1630.2(i). 
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“regarded as” prong.495  With respect to whether a ruling that accom-
modations are required in cases involving individuals regarded as dis-
abled would have a negative effect on employers, courts must keep in 
mind that the likelihood that a plaintiff would even be able to prove 
that she was regarded as having a disability is very small, and thus 
such a ruling is not likely to have a substantial effect on employers’ 
bottom lines. 
2. The Requirement That the Accommodation  
Be Reasonable 
Another issue courts must keep in mind is that even if they de-
cide that the ADA does require accommodations for individuals re-
garded as disabled, this does not mean that these employees will be 
entitled to any accommodation they desire.  The ADA requires only 
accommodations that are reasonable; any accommodation that would 
pose an undue hardship on an employer, such as one that puts a fi-
nancial strain on an employer or disrupts the efficient operation of 
an employer’s business, is not going to be required.496  Therefore, any 
employer fears that requiring accommodations in “regarded as” cases 
would have severe financial or efficiency consequences are simply un-
founded.  And, because most accommodations in “regarded as” cases 
would involve little cost, and because the employer is the party that ul-
timately chooses the accommodation, concerns over the costs of ac-
commodations should not exist.497  Thus, because the number of 
 
 495 Over the past few years, the Supreme Court has made it more difficult to prove 
a disability under the ADA.  Specifically, several recent cases have all resulted in em-
ployer-friendly outcomes on this issue.  See Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky., Inc., v. Williams, 
534 U.S. 184, 197 (2002) (holding that when determining whether an individual is 
substantially limited in the ability to perform manual tasks, the court must look at 
those tasks that are central to everyday life, and commenting that there must be a 
“demanding standard” for a plaintiff to qualify as disabled); Albertson’s, Inc., v. Kirk-
ingburg, 527 U.S. 555, 565–66 (1999) (holding that a body’s internal mechanisms 
that compensate for an individual’s physical limitations must be evaluated when de-
termining whether that individual suffers from a disability); Sutton v. United Air 
Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 475 (1999) (holding that mitigating measures must be 
taken into account when determining whether an individual suffers from a disability 
under the Act); see also Murphy v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 527 U.S. 516, 519 (1999) 
(following Sutton and concluding that mitigating measures must be considered when 
determining whether an individual suffers from a disability under the Act). 
 496 When determining whether an accommodation will cause an undue hardship, 
courts are to consider issues such as the cost of the accommodation, the overall fi-
nancial resources of the employer, the number of employees, the impact the ac-
commodation would have on the employer’s operation, and the impact on the em-
ployer’s ability to conduct business.  29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(p)(2) (2005). 
 497 In fact, according to at least one study, ADA accommodations cost little, if any, 
money.  See Peter David Blanck, Transcending Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act: 
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plaintiffs who would be able to fit into the “regarded as” category is 
small, and because the ADA requires only accommodations that are 
reasonable, courts should realize that if they were to require accom-
modations in these cases, it would not be fatal for employers. 
Despite these preliminary issues, courts still must determine 
what to do in these “regarded as” cases.  And, as the next few sections 
of this Article will demonstrate, the better solution is to require ac-
commodations in these cases or, at the very least, evaluate cases on a 
case-by-case basis, which is something courts do with several other 
ADA-related issues.498 
B. Reasons For Requiring Accommodations in “Regarded As” Cases 
As the next section of this Article will show, there are several rea-
sons why courts should require accommodations in cases involving 
individuals “regarded as” having a disability.  While some of these ar-
guments have been made by some of the courts that reached this 
conclusion, none of those courts used all of these reasons to provide 
a comprehensive justification for requiring accommodations.  These 
reasons include the ADA’s plain language, the remedial purposes be-
hind the ADA, furtherance of some of the ADA’s most important 
goals, the idea that employers should not benefit by creating and fol-
lowing stereotypes the ADA was meant to eliminate, the Supreme 
Court’s decision in School Board of Nassau County v. Arline,499 and the 
legislative history behind the “regarded as” prong of the ADA.500  As a 
 
A Case Report on Sears, Roebuck and Co., 20 MENTAL & PHYSICAL DISABILITY L. REP. 278, 
279 (1996) (concluding that 69% of the accommodations provided by Sears cost 
nothing; 28% of the accommodations cost less than $1000; only 3% of the accom-
modations cost over $1000; and that the average cost of an accommodation was 
$45.00).  And, unlike accommodations such as some type of physical alteration to the 
premises or any type of special equipment needed for an actually disabled employee, 
most accommodations for plaintiffs who are regarded as disabled would most likely 
cost even less.  With respect to the issue of which party makes the ultimate decision 
on which accommodation to provide, 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.9 (2005) provides that 
“the employer providing the accommodation has the ultimate discretion to choose between 
effective accommodations, and may choose the less expensive accommodation or the accom-
modation that is easier for it to provide.”  Id. (emphasis added). 
 498 See supra note 489. 
 499 480 U.S. 273 (1987). 
 500 One justification for which this Article will not provide further analysis is the 
interactive process argument made by the courts in Jacques v. DiMarzio, Inc., 200 F. 
Supp. 2d 151, 168–69 (E.D.N.Y. 2002), and Jewell v. Reid’s Confectionary Co., 172 F. 
Supp. 2d 212, 218–19 (D. Me. 2001).  Although this Article will not analyze this as a 
separate reason why accommodations should be required in “regarded as” cases, the 
arguments made by the courts in Jacques and Jewell do provide additional support for 
the proposition that accommodations should be required.  In addition to the argu-
ments made by those courts, it is important to keep in mind that this interactive 
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result of these concerns, courts should follow the First, Third, Tenth, 
and Eleventh Circuits and conclude that accommodations are re-
quired in “regarded as” cases. 
1. The ADA’s Plain Language 
The first reason why accommodations should be required in 
these cases is the ADA’s plain language.  As several courts, including 
the Supreme Court,501 have observed, this is the first place a court 
should look when interpreting a statute, and because the ADA’s lan-
guage does not distinguish between the three prongs of the disability 
definition, courts should apply this plain language.502 
Although one court concluded that the ADA’s plain language 
was not clear on this issue,503 all courts favoring accommodations for 
plaintiffs regarded as disabled considered the language clear.504  And, 
perhaps even more telling, several courts holding that accommodations 
are not required in these cases also conceded that the language is 
clear, and that the ADA does not distinguish between actual and “re-
garded as” disabilities on this issue.505  Thus, the plain language ar-
 
process would give an employee the chance to dispel any misperceptions an em-
ployer might have about a “disability” and make it more likely that she will be able to 
remain as an employee.  Also, even if the employee is unable to dispel the employer’s 
misperception, it is important to note that an employer is not required to provide any 
accommodation the employee requests; it is only obligated to provide one that allows her to 
perform her essential functions and does not pose an undue hardship.  See 29 C.F.R. 
app. § 1630.9 (2005) (noting that “the employer providing the accommodation has 
the ultimate discretion to choose between effective accommodations, and may 
choose the less expensive accommodation or the accommodation that is easier for it 
to provide”).  See also, 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A) (stating that an accommodation 
may not pose an undue hardship on the employer).  Therefore, any concern than an 
employee will be able to demand an accommodation an employer does not want to 
provide should not exist. 
 501 Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 340 (1997) (noting that the first step 
in interpreting a statute “is to determine whether the language at issue has a plain 
and unambiguous meaning with regard to the particular dispute in the case”). 
 502 See infra Section II.A and the notes contained therein for authorities that stand 
for this proposition. 
 503 Fontanilla v. City and County of S.F., No. C-96-3916 JCS, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
6919, at *48 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 28, 2001). 
 504 D’Angelo v. ConAgra Foods, Inc., 422 F.3d 1220, 1235–36 (11th Cir. 2005); 
Kelly v. Metallics W., Inc., 410 F.3d 670, 675–76 (10th Cir. 2005); Williams v. Phila. 
Hous. Auth. Police Dep’t, 380 F.3d 751, 774 (3d Cir. 2004); Lorinz v. Turner Constr. 
Co., No. 00 CV 6123SJ, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 28825, at *22–23 (E.D.N.Y. May 25, 
2004); Miller v. Heritage Prods., Inc., No. 1:02-cv-1345-DFH, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
8531, *27–28 (S.D. Ind. Apr. 21, 2004); Jacques, 200 F. Supp. 2d at 166; Jewell, 172 F. 
Supp. 2d at 218–19. 
 505 Weber v. Strippit, Inc., 186 F.3d 907, 917 (8th Cir. 1999); Kaplan v. City of N. 
Las Vegas, 323 F.3d 1226, 1232 (9th Cir. 2003). 
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gument provides solid support for requiring accommodations in 
these cases.  And, as the Eleventh Circuit noted in D’Angelo v. ConAgra 
Foods, Inc., courts are not free to ignore statutory language simply be-
cause they disagree with the outcome that language produces.506 
Because it is a fundamental canon of statutory construction that 
the plain language is the starting point for interpreting a statute, and 
because the Supreme Court has routinely applied the ADA’s plain 
language when interpreting this statute, the issue of accommodations 
for individuals regarded as disabled should be treated no differ-
ently.507  And, in response to the “bizarre results” or “windfall” argu-
ment many courts advance to reject an application of the plain lan-
guage, as the courts in D’Angelo, Kelly v. Metallics West, Inc., Williams v. 
Philadelphia Housing Authority Police Department, and Jacques v. DiMarzio, 
Inc. have countered, it is not bizarre to provide an accommodation to 
someone who (1) is being treated differently because of a perceived 
disability, (2) would be able to perform the essential functions of her 
job with an accommodation, and (3) is certainly not receiving what 
some courts consider to be a windfall.508 
Finally, even in cases in which a bizarre result might occur, which 
the Third Circuit in Williams and the Eleventh Circuit in D’Angelo ac-
knowledged could occur, this bizarre result might just have to be the 
occasional cost an employer must pay to effectuate the remedial pur-
poses of the ADA.  Or, as will be explained later in this Article, per-
haps the use of a case-by-case analysis of this issue would prevent such 
a bizarre result from happening, thus allaying any employer concerns 
over the issue.  Nevertheless, because the ADA’s plain language does 
not distinguish between actual disabilities and “regarded as” disabili-
ties, courts should require accommodations in “regarded as” cases.509 
 
 506 D’Angelo, 422 F.3d at 1238. 
 507 For example, the Supreme Court applied the ADA’s plain language when 
reaching its decisions in Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471 (1999), and in 
Pennsylvania Department of Corrections v. Yeskey, 524 U.S. 206 (1998).  Admittedly, these 
cases involved the interpretation of different sections of the ADA; nonetheless, the 
Court did answer the relevant issues by applying the ADA’s plain language. 
 508 D’Angelo, 422 F.3d at 1237–39; Kelly, 410 F.3d at 676; Williams, 380 F.3d at 774; 
Jacques, 200 F. Supp. 2d at 166. 
 509 Also, because the ADA’s plain language does not distinguish between actual 
disabilities and “regarded as” disabilities, there is no reason for courts to look at the 
EEOC’s position on this issue, which favors denying accommodations in these cases.  
Hennepin County Med. Ctr. v. Shalala, 81 F.3d 743, 748 (8th Cir. 1996) (relying on 
Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–43 
(1984), for the proposition that a statute’s plain language prevails over an agency in-
terpretation of the statute).  Also, because that agency interpretation is not found in 
a regulation, it is entitled to even less consideration.  Id.  
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2. The ADA, as a Remedial Statute, Should Be Interpreted 
Broadly to Eliminate Discrimination in the Workplace 
and to Further the ADA’s Purposes 
Another reason why accommodations should be required in 
cases involving individuals regarded as disabled is that the ADA is a 
remedial statute, and as such, it should be interpreted broadly.510  If 
courts were to give the ADA a broad interpretation, they would re-
quire accommodations in cases involving individuals who were re-
garded as disabled.  Once again, however, the accommodation must 
be reasonable, and any accommodation that would place an undue 
hardship on an employer would not be required.511  This reason for 
requiring accommodations in cases involving individuals regarded as 
disabled is not so unusual—it is a basic canon of statutory construc-
tion that remedial statutes should be interpreted broadly.512 
With respect to the issue of policy, requiring employers to ac-
commodate individuals regarded as disabled will allow more workers 
to remain in the workforce, something the ADA was certainly meant 
to encourage.513  Although it might be unclear how to accommodate a 
“non-existent” disability, that issue becomes more clear once courts 
realize that many of these “regarded as” individuals do have actual 
physical impairments; it is just that these impairments are not “sub-
stantially limiting,” a standard which is very hard to satisfy.  Even 
though these individuals might not have actual disabilities (which is a 
very high standard), their employers, who perceive them as disabled 
because of some type of physical or mental impairment, could still 
 
 510 Several courts, including the Supreme Court, have often commented that re-
medial statutes such as the ADA should be interpreted broadly.  See, e.g., Spector v. 
Norwegian Cruise Line, Ltd., 125 S. Ct. 2169, 2178 (2005) (noting that the ADA is a 
remedial statute designed to provide broad protection); Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 
U.S. 332, 336 (1967) (noting that remedial statutes should be construed broadly); 
Steger v. Franco, Inc., 228 F.3d 889, 894 (8th Cir. 2000) (noting that the ADA is a 
remedial statute and should be interpreted broadly).  Despite the fact that remedial 
statutes should be construed broadly, the Supreme Court has handed down several 
opinions that have narrowed, rather than expanded, the protections offered by the 
ADA.  See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Echazabal, 536 U.S. 73, 76 (2002) (holding that an 
employer is allowed to refuse to hire an individual if that individual poses a “direct 
threat” to self); U.S. Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391, 393 (2002) (holding that 
an employer is not required to violate its seniority system to accommodate an em-
ployee requesting a reasonable accommodation); see also supra note 495. 
 511 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A) (2000). 
 512 Spector, 125 S. Ct. at 2178 (noting that the ADA is a remedial statute designed 
to provide broad protection); Tcherepnin, 389 U.S. at 336 (noting that remedial stat-
utes should be construed broadly); Steger, 228 F.3d at 894 (noting that the ADA is a 
remedial statute and should be interpreted broadly). 
 513 See 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a) (2000). 
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provide an accommodation for their impairments that would allow 
them to be productive workers. 
This interpretation, of course, would benefit employees and em-
ployers alike, as it would allow employees to remain in the workforce 
and would lighten the cost of doing business for employers who 
would possibly be forced to hire new employees.514  This would also be 
consistent with Congress’s primary goal when passing the ADA, that 
of eliminating disability discrimination in the workplace.  As the 
court in Jacques v. DiMarzio, Inc. noted, “‘failure to mandate reason-
able accommodations would undermine the role the ADA plays in 
ferreting out disability discrimination in employment,’”515 and as the 
plaintiff in Deane v. Pocono Medical Center observed, “the ‘regarded as’ 
prong of the disability definition is premised upon the reality that the 
perception of disability, socially constructed and reinforced, is diffi-
cult to destroy, and in most cases, merely informing the employer of 
its misperception will not be enough.”516  Thus, this is yet another rea-
son accommodations should be required in “regarded as” cases. 
3. When the Employer is Responsible for the 
Misperception, It Should Bear the Costs of Its Mistake 
In cases involving individuals who are regarded as disabled, it is 
often the employer that causes the misperception.  When, however, 
the employee is responsible for her employer’s misperception, there 
is nothing wrong with not requiring an accommodation.  This was 
noted in Taylor v. Pathmark Stores, Inc.,517 in which the court, address-
ing a related issue, observed that employers can be held liable in “re-
garded as” cases unless the employer’s perception is based on the 
employee’s “unreasonable actions or omissions.”518 
However, in many cases, it is the employer that creates and does 
not correct its misperception, and fairness requires that because the 
employer in that scenario is at fault, it should be forced to accommo-
date the employee; courts should not allow employers to benefit by 
creating erroneous stereotypes about their employees.  This senti-
ment was expressed in Jewell v. Reid’s Confectionary, Co.,519 in which the 
 
 514 According to at least one study, the average ADA accommodation cost Sears, 
Roebuck & Co. less than $50, while it cost the company between $1800 and $2400 to 
hire a new employee.  See Blanck, supra note 497, at 283. 
 515 200 F. Supp. 2d 151, 167 (E.D.N.Y. 2002) (quoting Deane v. Pocono Med. Ctr., 
142 F.3d 138, 148 n.12 (3d Cir. 1998)). 
 516 Deane, 142 F.3d at 148 n.12. 
 517 177 F.3d 180 (3d Cir. 1999). 
 518 Id. at 193. 
 519 172 F. Supp. 2d 212 (D. Me. 2001). 
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court observed that because one purpose of the ADA was to punish 
employers for making stereotypic assumptions about employees and 
their abilities, not requiring accommodations in cases where employ-
ers make these erroneous assumptions would run counter to that 
goal.520  A similar sentiment was also present in Kelly v. Metallics West, 
Inc.: 
[A]n employer who is unable or unwilling to shed his or her 
stereotypic assumptions based on a faulty or prejudiced percep-
tion of an employee’s abilities must be prepared to accommodate 
the artificial limitations created by his or her own faulty percep-
tions.  In this sense, the ADA encourages employers to become 
more enlightened about their employees’ capabilities, while pro-
tecting employees from employers whose attitudes remain mired 
in prejudice.521 
Additionally, the court in Jacques expressed similar concerns 
when it noted that “[c]ategorically denying reasonable accommoda-
tions to ‘regarded as’ plaintiffs would allow the prejudices and biases 
of others to impermissibly deny an impaired employee his or her job 
because of the mistaken perception that the employee suffers from 
an actual disability.  This is the concern addressed by Congress, but 
ignored by Weber.”522  Finally, the plaintiff in Deane made the similar 
argument that “the ‘regarded as’ prong of the disability definition is 
premised upon the reality that the perception of disability, socially 
constructed and reinforced, is difficult to destroy, and in most cases, 
merely informing the employer of its misperception will not be 
enough.”523  Therefore, in those cases in which an employer refuses to 
shed its misperception of an employee’s disability, it should be re-
quired to accommodate the employee. 
As shown, several courts have expressed their view that when the 
employer is responsible for the misperception, it should not be al-
lowed to escape ADA liability.  And, also consistent with the ADA’s 
goals, requiring accommodations would allow employees regarded as 
disabled to remain in the workplace, something Congress would cer-
tainly appreciate. 
 
 520 Id. at 219. 
 521 Kelly v. Metallics W., Inc., 410 F.3d 670, 676 (10th Cir. 2005). 
 522 Jacques v. DiMarzio, Inc., 200 F. Supp. 2d 151, 168 (E.D.N.Y. 2002). 
 523 Deane v. Pocono Med. Ctr., 142 F.3d 138, 148 n.12 (3d Cir. 1998). 
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4. The Supreme Court’s Interpretation of the 
Rehabilitation Act in Arline and the ADA’s Legislative 
History 
As was mentioned earlier, and as is clear from the ADA, the pro-
tections afforded by the ADA are no weaker than those afforded by 
the Rehabilitation Act.524  Because the Supreme Court has already ex-
pressed its view that individuals disabled under the other prongs of 
the disability definition in the Rehabilitation Act are entitled to ac-
commodations, there is no reason why “regarded as” plaintiffs should 
be denied ADA protection.  As the Court noted in School Board of Nas-
sau County v. Arline: 
By amending the definition of “handicapped individual” to in-
clude not only those who are actually physically impaired, but also 
those who are regarded as impaired and who, as a result, are sub-
stantially limited in a major life activity, Congress acknowledged 
that society’s accumulated myths and fears about disability and 
disease are as handicapping as are the physical limitations that 
flow from actual impairment.525 
This demonstrates that the Court was just as concerned with people 
regarded as having disabilities as it was with those who are actually 
disabled, and that people regarded as having disabilities did, in fact, 
need protection from disability discrimination.  Thus, when an em-
ployee is treated unfavorably because of an employer’s perception of 
a disability, the employee should be entitled to the same types of ADA 
protections, including reasonable accommodations. 
This reasoning was adopted by several courts that have con-
cluded accommodations are required in “regarded as” cases,526 while 
the courts that ruled the other way have ignored the Supreme Court’s 
words in Arline.527  The fact remains, however, that when confronted 
with a similar issue, the Supreme Court suggested that employees re-
garded as disabled should be entitled to accommodations. 
This fact was specifically noted by Congress when it was contem-
plating the ADA, as it made constant references to the Arline opinion 
when addressing the “regarded as” prong of the disability defini-
 
 524 See supra note 43. 
 525 Sch. Bd. of Nassau County v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 284 (1987). 
 526 D’Angelo v. ConAgra Foods, Inc., 422 F.3d 1220, 1239 (11th Cir. 2005); Wil-
liams v. Phila. Hous. Auth. Police Dep’t, 380 F.3d 751, 775 (3d Cir. 2004); Jacques, 
200 F. Supp. 2d at 166–68. 
 527 For example, the Eighth Circuit in Weber v. Strippit, Inc., 186 F.3d 907 (8th Cir. 
1999), never mentioned Arline in its opinion. 
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tion.528  As such, courts should defer to the Supreme Court’s opinion 
in Arline and the legislative history behind the ADA when interpret-
ing the statute.  Of course, because the ADA’s language is clear, there 
really is no need to look past its plain language; nonetheless, if a 
court wishes to do so, Supreme Court precedent and the ADA’s legis-
lative history both support requiring accommodations in cases involv-
ing “regarded as” individuals. 
Therefore, there are many reasons, both from a statutory inter-
pretation standpoint and from a policy standpoint, why employers 
should be required to accommodate individuals they regard as dis-
abled.  Even if such a rule results in an occasional bizarre outcome, 
that might be necessary in order to assure that other people who 
need the ADA’s protections do, in fact, receive them.  However, if an 
across-the-board rule requiring accommodations is not adopted, an-
other option is to adopt a rule that calls for a case-by-case determina-
tion of whether accommodations should be provided in “regarded as” 
cases. 
C. Another Possible Option: A Case-by-Case Analysis 
Instead of using a bright-line rule for deciding these cases, an-
other possible option exists that would resolve most of the concerns 
of those who have a stake in this issue.  This compromise would be to 
evaluate each individual on a case-by-case basis, with some individuals 
who are regarded as disabled being entitled to accommodations, and 
other such individuals not being entitled to accommodations.  Al-
though this might not seem consistent, courts have used case-by-case 
determinations when addressing other ADA issues, and using such an 
approach in this situation could allay the fears of employers and em-
ployees alike.529 
In this analysis, one factor to be analyzed would be which party is 
at fault for the employer’s perception that the employee is disabled.  
This issue was discussed in Taylor v. Pathmark Stores, Inc., in which the 
court, on a related issue, indicated that an employer should not be 
held liable in “regarded as” cases when the employee’s unreasonable 
actions or omissions caused the employer’s misperception.530  Under 
Taylor, if the employee is responsible for her employer’s mispercep-
tion, that would cut against requiring the employer to provide her 
with a reasonable accommodation.  Using this as a factor against re-
 
 528 D’Angelo, 422 F.3d at 1236–37; Williams, 380 F.3d at 775; Jacques, 200 F. Supp. 
2d at 166–68. 
 529 See supra note 489. 
 530 177 F.3d 180, 193 (3d Cir. 1999). 
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quiring accommodations in “regarded as” cases would prevent em-
ployees from gaining any type of unfair advantage and would limit an 
employee’s ability to use the ADA as a sword rather than as a shield.  
It would also encourage and possibly force employers to shed un-
founded biases and stereotypes they hold about their employees, 
which is something the ADA was meant to encourage.  Finally, using 
this factor would force the parties to actively engage in the interactive 
process of evaluating an employee’s limitations and abilities to de-
termine what accommodation would allow an employee to perform 
the essential functions of her position.  This is consistent with what 
the interactive process was meant to address and would also allow 
more employees to continue working. 
Another relevant factor courts could use would be to examine 
under which prong of the “regarded as” definition the employee 
fits.531  If the employee suffers from no physical or mental impairment 
at all, this factor would cut against requiring an accommodation.  In 
these cases, where there is absolutely nothing wrong with the em-
ployee, it is more likely that requiring an accommodation would be 
bizarre.  Additionally, in a situation where an employee has no im-
pairment, the perception could be remedied quite easily by a discus-
sion between the employer, the employee, and perhaps a medical 
professional.  However, in the more common scenario in which an 
employee does have a physical or mental impairment that might not 
rise to the level of a substantially limiting one, but does cause her 
employer to regard her as disabled, this factor would weigh in favor 
of requiring employers to accommodate the employee to the extent 
the employer thinks she would then be able to perform the essential 
functions of her job.  This would allow employees to continue work-
ing and remain contributing members of the employer’s workforce.  
As long as the accommodation would allow the employee to continue 
to work (and would not place an undue hardship on the employer), 
both the employee’s and the employer’s objectives would be met. 
A third factor to evaluate would be the windfall/bizarre result is-
sue raised by the courts in Weber v. Strippit, Inc.532 and Kaplan v. City of 
North Las Vegas.533  As the Third and Eleventh Circuits noted in Wil-
liams v. Philadelphia Housing Authority Police Department534 and D’Angelo 
v. ConAgra Foods, Inc.,535 respectively, such a bizarre result could occur 
 
 531 See supra note 5. 
 532 186 F.3d 907, 916 (8th Cir. 1999). 
 533 323 F.3d 1226, 1232 (9th Cir. 2003). 
 534 380 F.3d 751, 774 (3d Cir. 2004). 
 535 422 F.3d 1220, 1227–28 (11th Cir. 2005). 
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in some cases; however, because it would not occur in all cases, this 
could be one more factor to consider when using this case-by-case 
approach.  If providing an accommodation in that particular case 
would yield such a bizarre result, then that factor would cut against 
requiring the accommodation.  However, as was the case in D’Angelo, 
Kelly v. Metallics West, Inc., Williams, and Jacques v. DiMarzio, Inc., when 
an accommodation would not yield such a bizarre result, that factor 
would weigh in favor of requiring the accommodation. 
Finally, courts could evaluate the nature of the accommodation 
requested.  As was indicated earlier, an employer is only required to 
provide a reasonable accommodation, and one that would not pose an 
undue hardship.  One possible way to balance the interests of the 
parties in these cases would be to have a slightly higher standard for 
what constitutes a “reasonable accommodation” and a slightly lower 
standard for what constitutes an “undue hardship” in cases involving 
“regarded as” disabilities.  Examining the nature of the accommoda-
tion would comfort employees by giving them the knowledge that 
there is not an absolute ban against accommodations in “regarded as” 
cases, and it would comfort employers by letting them know that no 
accommodation forced upon them would drastically affect their op-
erations.  Although this could be one factor in the analysis, the ADA’s 
current reasonableness and undue hardship standards are adequate 
to address the competing interests of the parties to the employment 
relationship; therefore, this factor might not be a particularly neces-
sary one. 
Therefore, if courts are concerned that an across-the-board rule 
either requiring or denying accommodations in cases involving “re-
garded as” individuals would result in unjust outcomes, this case-by-
case approach could be a sensible alternative.  Although a bright-line 
rule allows for more predictability, as was previously addressed, there 
are several ADA issues that are decided on a case-by-case basis; there-
fore, this concern for predictability should not be a critical one.  Re-
gardless of the ultimate outcome, it is clear that the Supreme Court 
needs to resolve this issue, which has caused confusion among the 
various federal courts. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
As this Article made clear, there is a major split of authority on 
the issue of whether individuals who are regarded as disabled should 
receive accommodations under the ADA.  While many courts still fa-
vor denying these accommodations, the three most recent United 
States Courts of Appeals to address this issue have ruled that accom-
ROSENTHAL FINAL.DOC 3/6/2006  3:27:15 PM 
2006] ACCOMMODATIONS IN “REGARDED AS” CASES 969 
modations are required in “regarded as” cases.  Unless and until the 
Supreme Court and/or all of the remaining United States Courts of 
Appeals decide this issue, confusion will continue to exist for those 
courts within the several jurisdictions that have not reached a defini-
tive answer. 
Although there are several reasons for and against requiring ac-
commodations in cases involving individuals regarded as disabled, 
those courts holding that accommodations are required have the bet-
ter arguments.  The plain language of the statute, the broad remedial 
purpose of the ADA, the furtherance of the ADA’s important goals, 
the ineffectiveness of a policy that rewards employers who create and 
follow faulty perceptions of their employees’ capabilities, the interac-
tive process involved in determining what accommodations an em-
ployer should provide to an employee,536 the inaccuracy of the wind-
fall argument, the Supreme Court’s decision in School Board of Nassau 
County v. Arline,537 and Congress’s reliance on that opinion when 
drafting the ADA all favor requiring accommodations in these cases. 
However, as an alternative to this bright-line rule of requiring 
accommodations in “regarded as” cases, and as is the case with many 
ADA issues, courts could use a case-by-case approach when resolving 
this issue.  This approach would consider: (1) who is responsible for 
the employer’s perception of the employee’s “disability”; (2) into 
which prong of the “regarded as” definition the employee fits; (3) 
whether providing an accommodation in such a case would yield a 
bizarre result; and (4) the nature of the accommodation requested.  
This multi-factor test could be used to determine, on a case-by-case 
basis, whether accommodations should be provided in a particular 
“regarded as” case.  This alternative analysis would allow courts to 
reach the “right” outcome in each case, without worrying about fol-
lowing a bright-line rule that would yield the “wrong” result in several 
cases.  This would further Congress’s goals of protecting those who 
need the ADA’s protection and of providing a shield for those em-
ployees who are not trying to use the ADA as a sword. 
 
 
 536 Although I did not devote a separate portion of Section V to this argument, 
the arguments made in Section II.C of this Article regarding the ADA’s interactive 
process provide additional support for the conclusion that courts should require ac-
commodations in “regarded as” cases. 
 537 480 U.S. 273 (1987). 
